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OKLAHOMA
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NUMBER 4

SUPPORT ALIMONY: THE UNCERTAIN STATE
OF THE LAW
ROBERT G.

SPECTOR*

L Introduction
In a rare moment of candor, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted
several years ago that its alimony decisions were "uncertain."' Commen-2
tators have agreed that the area of support alimony is today's enigma.
The reason for the present uncertainty and confusion in the law may be
traced to the Oklahoma Supreme Court's failure to recognize basic legislative changes in Oklahoma's support alimony statutes.
Prior to 1976, the alimony statute - title 43, section 121 (formerly
title 12, section 1276) - contained two statements regarding alimony.
First, the statute provided:
When a divorce shall be granted by reason of the fault or
aggression of the husband, the wife ...

shall be allowed such

alimony out of the husband's real and personal property as the
court shall think reasonable, having due regard to the value of
his real and personal estate at the time of said divorce; which
alimony may be allowed to her in real or personal property,
or both, or by decreeing to her such sum of money, payable

o
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1. Funnell v. Funnell, 584 P.2d 1319, 1323 (Okla. 1979).
2. See Wagner & Grundy, Support Alimony: Family Law's Ever Evolving Enigma, 60 OaL.
B.J. 3197 (1989); C. Thompson, Preparation of an Alimony Case (1990) (unpublished seminar
presentation given at Oklahoma Bar Association Family Law Section CLE Melange IV, Oklahoma
City, Okla., Sept. 28, 1990; Tulsa, Okla., Oct. 19, 1990).
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either in gross or in installment, as the court may deem just
and equitable,:
The final sentence of the statute provided:
In case of a finding by the court that such divorce should be
granted on account of the fault or aggression of the wife, the
court may set apart to the husband and for the support of the
children, issue of the marriage, such portion of the wife's
4
separate estate as may be proper.
In 1976, the legislature amended the statute to eliminate the fault
aspect.' The sexes were equalized by removing references to husband and
wife. The statute's final sentence was amended to authorize the court to
set apart a portion of the separate property of the non-custodial spouse
for child support.6 The second change was the enactment of title 43,
section 134(A) (formerly title 12, section 1289(A)). After several amendments, section 134(A) required tribunals to distinguish between periodic
payments pertaining to property division and those payments designated
as support. 7 The former continue until completed; the latter are subject
to the provisions of subsections 134(B)-(G).
As noted above, prior to the amendments the major determinant of
support alimony w&3 fault. Many of the pre-1976 cases blended the concept
of support alimony with the property division award.8 The amendments
should have required courts to reconsider the basis for support alimony.
All prior cases that used fault as the basis for support alimony or confused
alimony and property concepts should have been eliminated as precedent.
However, except for one case from the court of appeals, the basic statutory
changes have been ignored.9 Both the supreme court and the court of appeals
continue to cite pre-1976 cases as authoritative, resulting in what can, at
best, be described a,;
judicially-authorized confusion.' 0 The result mandates
a discussion of the law that existed prior to 1976.
IL The Law of Alimony 1908-1975
A. The Basis of Support Alimony
1. Sex
The Oklahoma Supreme Court first defined alimony in Poloke v.
Poloke," as "an allowance which the husband pays, by order of court,
3. 12

OKLA. STAT.

§ 121 (1971).

4. Id.
5. 1976 Okla. Se&;. Laws ch. 154, § 1.
6. Id.
7. 43 OKuA. STAT. § 134(A) (Supp. 1990).
8. Barnett v. Barnett, 158 Okla. 270, 13 P.2d 104 (1932); Dobry v. Dobry, 203 Okla. 327,
220 P.2d 698 (1950).
9. See Bowman v. Bowman, 639 P.2d 1257 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
10. E.g., Ford v. Ford, 766 P.2d 950 (Okla. 1988) (citing Eisenreich v. Eisenreich, 323 P.2d
723 (Okla. 1958)); Wocd v. Wood, 793 P.2d 1372 (Okla. App. 1990) (citing Dowdell v. Dowdell,
463 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1990).
11. 37 Okla. 70, 130 P. 535 (1913).
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to his wife for her maintenance while living separate from him, where no
suit is brought for divorce, or during the pendency of a divorce suit or
after the divorce is granted."' 2 However, in Poloke, the court could not
find any authority requiring a former wife to pay alimony to her exhusband.' 3 Accordingly, the trial court's order requiring the wife to pay
4
her husband $50 a month in alimony was reversed.'
In subsequent cases, such as Barnett v. Barnett," the court did authorize
the payment of alimony from a wife to a husband.16 The court based its
decision on the last sentence of section 121, which allowed a portion of
the separate property of the wife to be set aside to the husband when he
had custody of the children. In Barnett, the court concluded that the
addition of the last sentence to the statute in 1913 reflected an intention
to "make the statutes relating to alimony equally applicable to both
parties as a matter of common justice, and to cover the numerous cases
where all the property is in the wife's name."'' 7 The trial court's decision
granting the husband custody of the children and $15,000 alimony was
affirmed.'"
2. Fault
An alimony award, according to the statute, required the court to
determine whether the marriage dissolved because of the "fault or aggression" of the husband.' 9 It did not matter whether the wife was also
at fault.2 0 However, if the wife was denied a divorce, she could not receive
alimony because she would not be living separate and apart for just
cause. 21

In some cases, the court stated that when the divorce was the husband's
fault the wife was entitled to alimony. 22 In one case, the court held that
the wife should be awarded alimony even if she did not request it in her
pleading. 23 In Dowdell v. Dowdell,24 the court went even further and
stated that when the divorce was granted because of the husband's fault,
the wife was entitled to receive alimony "in a sum more commensurate

12. Id., 130 P. at 535.
13. Id.
14. Id.

15. 158 Okla. 270, 13 P.2d 104 (1932).
16. Id., 13 P.2d at 106.
17. Id., 13 P.2d at 105.
18. Id., 13 P.2d at 106-07; see also Bowring v. Bowring, 196 Okla. 520, 166 P.2d 415 (1946).
19. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 121 (Supp. 1990).
20. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 275 P.2d 997 (Okla. 1954); Adams v. Adams, 30 Okla. 327,
120 P. 566 (1911).
21. Davis v. Davis, 61 Okla. 275, 161 P. 190, 192 (1916).
22. Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624, 119 P.2d 825, 827 (1941); Albert v. Albert, 120
Okla. 172, 251 P. 476, 478 (1926).
23. Kupka v. Kupka, 190 Okla. 392, 124 P.2d 389, 390 (1942). But see Dunham v. Dunham,
777 P.2d 403, 405 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989) (if alimony is not raised at the trial-court level it cannot
be considered on appeal).
24. 463 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1969).
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with the mode of living to which she has become accustomed as defendant's wife."

'2 -

In other cases, even though the divorce was granted because of the
husband's fault, alimony was denied. The seminal case is Seyller v.
Seyller.26 The court reversed a $1200 alimony judgment. 27 The marriage
lasted only nine months. 28 The wife was a school teacher and was capable
of earning her own living. 29 After the separation, she resumed living at
her own residence where she lived before the marriage. 0 The court noted
that she only lived with her husband for nine months. She received $700
alimony pendente lite." The court found that this amount was more than
sufficient.3 2 In other cases, the wife was denied alimony because she was
too extravagant, 33 was already trained for a career,3 4 had more money

than her husband," or, according to the trial court, did not need ali36
mony.
3. Need
There was some question whether a court could allow alimony when
the divorce was granted because of the wife's fault. Early cases did not
discuss whether the wife could obtain alimony. 37 She was, however, clearly
entitled to an equitable division of property regardless of fault. 8 In
Newman v. Newman, 39 the court announced that fault was not required
before the wife could be awarded alimony:
Under our statutes ... where a divorce is granted the husband
because of the faults of the wife, she is not as a matter of
right entitled to alimony out of the husband's estate, but it is
discretionary with the court to a very considerable extent, when
25. Id. at 952.
26. 96 Okla. 135, 220 P. 626 (1923).
27. Id., 220 P. at 626.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012, 1024 (1933).
34. Seddicum v. Seddicum, 167 Okla. 420, 30 P.2d 156, 158 (1934) (no error to deny alimony
when wife trained for office work and has been working).
35. McCarty v. McCarty, 193 Okla. 18, 141 P.2d 103, 106 (1943) (wife's accumulation of
property and alimony from previous marriage between the parties means that she has a greater
estate than he does).
36. Peters v. Peters, 5:19 P.2d 26, 27 (Okla. 1975) (no alimony awarded because wife received
college degree during the marriage while being supported by her husband who did not have a
college degree); Blesch v. Blesch, 204 Okla. 426, 230 P.2d 723, 726 (1951) (trial court's discretion
not to award alimony sustained without reason); Weaver v. Weaver, 545 P.2d 1305, 1309 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1975) (absent evidence of need it is error to award alimony).
37. Hughes v. Hughes, 131 Okla. 33, 267 P. 620, 621 (1928).
38. Moody v. Moody, 120 Okla. 128, 250 P. 916, 917-18 (1926); Tobin v. Tobin, 89 Okla.
12, 213 P. 884, 888 (1923); Thompson v. Thompson, 70 Okla. 207, 173 P. 1037, 1038 (1918).
39. 144 Okla. 160, 290 P. 179 (1930).
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the property of the husband will justify it, to allow her alimony
in such amount or amounts as not to leave her destitute or a
charge upon society. This rule rests upon a humanitarian reason
40

Eventually the court used the same criteria to measure an alimony
award to the wife regardless of fault. Without expressly so indicating,
the court abandoned the language that the award was a humanitarian
gesture to prevent the wife from obtaining welfare. 4' Eventually, given
that all divorces were granted on the grounds of incompatibility, the court
rarely utilized any fault language. 42 However, as late as the 1970s, the
court would occasionally opine that if the incompatibility were the fault
of the husband, alimony was required. 43 Hence, until very recently,
trial
44
courts often declared whose fault caused the incompatibility.
B. Determining the Size of the Alimony Award
The amount of alimony awarded was originally held to be within the
trial court's discretion. 4 However, while generally noting the trial court's
discretion, the supreme court tended to modify the alimony award. Rarely
did the court indicate precisely why the trial court's alimony award was
either inadequate or excessive. 46 The appellate courts' proclivity to substitute their judgment for the trial courts' reached its zenith in Atteberry
v. Atteberry.47 The trial court awarded $84,000 in support alimony. 4 The
40. Id., 290 P. at 180; see also Chilton v. Chilton, 207 Okla. 467, 252 P.2d 121 (1952); Herd
v. Bilby, 199 Okla. 437, 186 P.2d 833 (1947); Haynes v. Haynes, 190 Okla. 596, 126 P.2d 65
(1942) ($1,000 is adequate alimony when divorce is granted because of wife's fault); Whitehorn
v. Whitehorn, 178 Okla. 633, 64 P.2d 299 (1937); Flaxman v. Flaxman, 177 Okla. 28, 57 P.2d
819 (1936) (court is authorized to declare this rule because when the legislature fails to make a
needed change, the courts are authorized to do so in recognition of the elastic nature of the
common law).
41. See Bessinger v. Bessinger, 372 P.2d 870, 873 (Okla. 1962); Eisenreich v. Eisenreich, 323
P.2d 723 (Okla. 1958); Murphy v. Murphy, 276 P.2d 920, 924 (Okla. 1954).
42. See Zink v. Zink, 390 P.2d 504 (Okla. 1964) (incompatibility divorces are not those where
the conduct of either party constitutes grounds for divorce). The court grounded itself on general
language to justify the trial court's award, a situation much like today's cases. Id. at 508; see,
e.g., Kirkland v. Kirkland, 488 P.2d 1222 (Okla. 1971) (alimony award based on wife's need
and husband's ability to pay because he has inherited a substantial sum of money).
43. See Dowdell v. Dowdell, 463 P.2d 948, 949 (Okla. 1969).
44. See, e.g., Stansberry v. Stansberry, 580 P.2d 147, 150 (Okla. 1978).
45. See, e.g., Kiddie v. Kiddie, 563 P.2d 139 (Okla. 1977); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 385 P.2d
462 (Okla. 1963); Bishop v. Bishop, 194 Okla. 209, 148 P.2d 472 (1944); Winslow v. Winslow,
156 Okla. 260, 10 P.2d 666 (1932); Doutt v. Doutt, 73 Okla. 213, 175 P. 740 (1918); Hildebrand
v. Hildebrand, 41 Okla. 306, 137 P. 711 (1913).
46. See, e.g., Warr v. Warr, 386 P.2d 639 (Okla. 1963) (alimony reduced from $210,000 to
$105,000, no reason given); Wilson v. Wilson, 198 Okla. 318, 177 P.2d 1020 (1947) (alimony
reduced from $3,000 to $1500, "given all the circumstances"); Sango v. Sango, 105 Okla. 166,
232 P. 49 (1924); Derritt v. Derritt, 66 Okla. 124, 168 P. 455 (1917) (trial court's award of
alimony modified as "inequitable").
47. 554 P.2d 1370 (Okla. 1976).
48. Id. at 1371.
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court of appeals reduced it to $27,000. 49 The supreme court concluded
that $72,000 was the appropriate amount.50 However, Justices Hodges
and Barnes, while concurring in reversing the appellate court, decided
that the correct amount was $42,000.11 Justices Simms and Doolin thought
the trial court was correct 2 None of the judges indicated why their
particular figures were correct. This willingness of the appellate courts to
substitute their sums without reasoning for the trial courts' award amounts
remains a hallmark in appellate alimony litigation.
In Bowman v. Bowman,53 the court of appeals noted that, prior to the
1976 amendments, the supreme court approved a number of criteria as
circumstances the court can consider when awarding alimony. Many of
these criteria are duplicative. No court has ever suggested that all criteria
should be examined in each case. Additionally, for every case cited there
is usually another case that holds precisely the opposite upon the same
or similar set of facts.
1. InheritanceLoss
The wife's loss of the right of inheritance from the husband and the
expectation of a future inheritance from the husband are occasionally
mentioned in the cases. In Harden v. Harden5 4 the wife received $300,000
in support alimony."5 The amount represented approximately what the
wife would have received by electing against her husband's will had he
died. 6
There are cases in which the court has suggested that alimony be
measured by the araount of the elective share. 7 However, in other cases
the court has said that neither the amount of inheritance nor the value
of an elective share has anything to do with alimony.5
2.

The Husband's Capacity to Pay

The husband's future earning capacity has often been a major consideration in determining the size of the alimony award. 9 Sometimes this
49. Id. at 1374.
50. Id.
51. Id. (Hodges, J., cncurring, joined by Barnes, J.).
52. Id. (Simms, J., concurring, joined by Doolin, J.).
53. 639 P.2d 1257 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
54. 182 Okla. 364, 77 P.2d 721 (1938).
55. Because of the year and making allowances for inflation, this is probably the largest
amount of alimony ever awarded.
56. Harden, 77 P.2d at 724.
57. See Mosely v. Iloely, 171 Okla. 150, 42 P.2d 237 (1935) (alimony reduced so that wife
receives only one-third); Stott v. Stott, 122 Okla. 266, 254 P. 722 (1927) (alimony raised to
$4,000 to ensure wife receives one-third); Derritt v. Derritt, 66 Okla. 124, 168 P. 455 (1917).
58. Smyth v. Smyth, 198 Okla. 478, 179 P.2d 920, 923 (1947); Miller v. Miller, 186 Okla.
566, 99 P.2d 515, 519 (1940); Burtrum v. Burtrum, 184 Okla. 61, 84 P.2d 598, 599 (1938), cert.
denied, 61 S. Ct. 9 (1940).
59. Mathews v. Mathews, 186 Okla. 245, 96 P.2d 1054, 1056 (1939); see also Weekley v.
Weekley, 208 Okla. 651, 257 P.2d 622 (1953) (when husband has no estate, alimony can be
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factor was called the earning capacity of the husband, 60 the probability
of the husband's ability to progress financially, 61 the husband's present
ability to pay, 62 or any future increase in the value of the husband's land
or other property. 63 However, sometimes the court indicated that the
64
husband's future earnings did not affect the measure of the alimony.
3.

The Wife's Need

Also basic to the size of the alimony award was the wife's condition
and means. 6 This factor included examining the wife's health, 66 her
opportunity for employment, 67 her earning capacity and its relation to

the marriage, 68 as well as her education. 69 However, occasionally the court
would opine that the award of support alimony was not barred even
though the wife had enough money to keep herself in her accustomed
style.

4.

70

The Wife's Contributions

Even though the role of the wife's contributions to the husband's estate
is a property consideration, the court occasionally used it to justify an

figured upon his earning capacity); Jupe v. Jupe, 198 Okla. 100, 175 P.2d 976 (1947) (the
husband's estate is of no consequence since he is regularly employed and possesses no estate).
60. Funk v. Funk, 319 P.2d 599, 601 (Okla. 1957) ; see also Whayman v. Whayman, 207
Okla. 371, 249 P.2d 1004 (1952) (alimony awarded even though the husband will have to find
another job after retirement to pay it).
61. Conrad v. Conrad, 471 P.2d 892 (Okla. Ct. App. 1969) (ability to progress financially
did not mean that the husband had to hold a job). See Wise v. Wise, 175 Okla. 310, 52 P.2d
175 (1935) (alimony can be awarded even though husband has never held a job because he has
wealthy parents who have maintained him).
62. Jupe, 175 P.2d at 978.
63. Johnston v. Johnston, 440 P.2d 694, 697-98 (Okla. 1968); see also Seelig v. Seelig, 460
P.2d 433 (Okla. 1969) (alimony may exceed the total of the marital and separate estates, based
on husband's earning capacity); Swanson v. Swanson, 207 Okla. 423, 250 P.2d 40 (1951) (evidence
showed that husband's headright would become more valuable in the future, thus allowing for
alimony).
64. Laster v. Laster, 370 P.2d 823 (Okla. 1962) (alimony reduced on appeal because at trial
the husband was unable to work fulltime, even though testimony showed he would be able to
resume fulltime employment); Smyth v. Smyth, 198 Okla. 478, 179 P.2d 920 (1947) (alimony
award should be reduced when it appears husband would have to pay it out of -his inheritance);
Miller v. Miller, 186 Okla. 566, 99 P.2d 515 (1940) (allowance for alimony should be with a
view to the circumstances of the parties as they are at the date of divorce; subsequent financial
conditions should not be considered); Moseley v. Moseley, 171 Okla. 150, 42 P.2d 237 (1935)
(alimony must be based on size of estate and cannot dkceed the estate's value); West v. West,
114 Okla. 279, 246 P. 599 (1926) (same as Miller).
65. Eisenreich v. Eisenreich, 323 P.2d 723, 724-25 (Okla. 1958) (wife is handicapped).
66. Henley V. Henley, 428 P.2d 258, 260 (Okla. 1967).
67. Kirkland v. Kirkland, 488 P.2d 1222, 1227 (Okla. 1970) (wife untrained to earn a living);
Fitzer v. Fitzer, 460 P.2d 888, 891 (Okla. 1969); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 461 P.2d 614, 616 (Okla.
1969).
68. Conrad v. Conrad, 471 P.2d 892, 893 (Okla. 1969).
69. Kirkland, 488 P.2d at 1227.
70. De Roin v. De Roin, 198 Okla. 430, 179 P.2d 685, 687-88 (1947).
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alimony award.2 However, the court usually
found this factor appropri72
ately irrelevant to an alimony discussion.
5. The Nature of the Marriage
A factor of some importance in the fault era was whether the marriage
was one of affection or convenience.7 3 Such factors as the duration of the
marriage and ages of the parties were also considered.7 4 However, there are
cases suggesting that the reason why the parties married is irrelevant.75
6. The Standard of Living
The mode of living to which the wife had become accustomed during the
marriage has been deemed important.7 6 In one case, the supreme court
granted certiorari solely to increase alimony from $36,000 to $48,000 based
on the couple's standard of living. 77 However, the court has also said that
the parties' station in life
should not be used to allow the wife to continue
7
to live in extravagance.

1

7. The Degree of Fault
Prior to 1976, fault was not only a basis for alimony but was also used
to determine the size of the alimony award. The court considered the conduct
of the parties. 79 In other cases the court dismissed fault as a factor in the
alimony calculation. 0
8. Children
The ages of the children and the need to maintain a home for them were
also factors in determining the amount of alimony. 8' Other cases rejected
71. Id. (husband should pay because the wife supported the family for fifteen years and he
owns land that produces an income).
72. Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624, 119 P.2d 825, 827 (1941) (wife's lack of
contributions toward the accumulation of the marital estate appear irrelevant in setting alimony).
73. Dobry v. Dobry, 203 Okla. 327, 220 P.2d 698, 700 (1950); Mathews v. Mathews, 186
Okla. 245, 96 P.2d 1054, 1057 (1939).
74. Hughes v. Hughes, 363 P.2d 155, 159 (Okla. 1961); see also Whitehorn v. Whitehorn,
178 Okla. 633, 64 P.2d 299 (1937) (when wife had married husband for his money she should
not receive much alimony).
75. Albert v. Albert, 120 Okla. 172, 251 P. 476, 477-78 (1926) (for alimony purposes why
wife married husband and what the nature of their marriage was does not matter).
76. Dowdell v. Dowdell, 463 P.2d 948, 952 (Okla. 1969) (the parties' station in life before
the divorce); Herndon v. Herndon, 503 P.2d 545, 547 (Okla. 1972).
77. Durland v. Durlard, 552 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Okla. 1976).
78. Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012, 1024 (1933).
79. Kirkland v. Kirkland, 488 P.2d 1222, 1227 (Okla. 1971); see also Drake v. Drake, 187
Okla. 1, 100 P.2d 887 (1940); Doutt v. Doutt, 73 Okla. 213, 175 P. 740 (1918) (amount of
alimony justified because of husband's adultery).
80. See, e.g., Noel v. Noel, 206 Okla. 16, 240 P.2d 739 (1952) (alimony award should be
reduced from $1200 to $700 even though husband is at fault; alimony should not be a penalty);
Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012 (1933) (husband's fault does not justify awarding
wife alimony).
81. Price v. Price, 484 P.2d 532, 536 (Okla. 1971); see also Barnett v. Barnett, 158 Okla.
270, 13 P.2d 104 (1932); Gist v. Gist, 537 P.2d 460 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) (alimony justified
because wife will find it impossible to raise a minor child with no special training and education).
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C. Relationship to Property Division
Prior to the creation of section 134 and its subsequent amendments from
1965-1979, the relationship between property division, monetary awards,
and support alimony was obscure. 3 Fault was clearly necessary for an
alimony award but irrelevant to the property division. Since, at the time,
neither property awards nor alimony awards were modifiable or terminable,
it rarely mattered what the trial court called the award. The following cases
illustrate the confusion.
In Barnett v. Barnett,14 the trial court awarded the husband alimony under
the last sentence of the old version of section 121:
In the case of a finding by the court that such divorce should
be granted on account of the fault or aggression of the wife, the
court may set aside to the husband and for the support of the
children, issue of the marriage, such portion of the wife's separate
estate as may be proper.8 5
The sentence does not use the word "alimony." The trial court's finding,
upon which the award of alimony in the amount of $15,000 was based,
and which the appellate court affirmed, was as follows:
The court further finds that inasmuch as defendant has lived
with plaintiff for a period of fifteen years, and has used his
efforts during said time for the benefit of plaintiff and in the
management of her property, and has not, during said time, used
the plaintiff's property or money to improve his own business
affairs, or to improve his own individual property, that said
defendant is entitled to alimony. 6
Similarly, in Dobry v. Dobry,17 the property of the husband consisted
only of $30,000 worth of stock, which had been acquired before marriage."
No property was awarded to the wife.8 9 The trial court awarded her $10,800
as alimony.9 The supreme court upheld the award and reasoned in two not
easily reconcilable sentences that "[tihe basic idea of alimony is that it is
an allowance for the support of the wife .... Under the circumstances the
82. Seddicum v. Seddicuni, 167 Okla. 420, 30 P.2d 156 (1934) (fact that wife has the children
does not justify giving her alimony when she is trained as an office worker); Kunc v. Kunc, 186
Okla. 297, 97 P.2d 771 (1939).
83. Funnell v. Funneil, 584 P.2d 1319 (Okla. 1979).
84. 158 Okla. 270, 13 P.2d 104 (1932).
85. Id., 13 P.2d at 105-06 (citing 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1289 (1971) amended by 1976 Okla. Sess.
Laws ch. 154, § 1).
86. Barnett, 13 P.2d at 106.
87. 203 Okla. 327, 220 P.2d 698 (1950).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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award in its nature is a division of the defendant's property arising from
the plaintiff's former relation and the defendant's aggression." 91
Given the extreme confusion of the pre-1976 cases, they should only be
used as precedent with a large amount of caution.
IH. The Modern Law of Support Alimony
A.

The Basis for Support Alimony

The 1976 amendments to section 121 eliminated both fault and gender as
bases for support aiimony. 92 As a result, most of the earlier cases which
determined those issues should be obsolete. Unfortunately, only one court
has decided what remains as the basis for support alimony. In Bowman v.
Bowman, 93 the court concluded that with fault excised from the statute,
"need has become the primary, if not the sole criterion as a basis for an
alimony award." 94 The court went further and held that the need must be
rationally connected to the marriage itself.
If the need arises out of or is aggravated by the marriage itself
or some event connected to the marriage, i.e., illness, postponement of education, or any other cause rationally connected to
the marriage, then it qualifies as a "basis" on which alimony
should be prop.erly granted where the circumstances of the parties
otherwise justify an award of alimony. 9
In Bowman, the court concluded that the trial court erred in awarding
any alimony to Ms. Bowman.9 6 At the time of the marriage, Ms. Bowman
had been employed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for
seventeen yearsY She owned her own home valued at $33,000, a car,
furnishings, and had $1000 in savings. 9 During the two-year marriage, the
wife lived with the husband, and the husband paid all the parties' expenses. 99
The wife allowed her disabled adult children to live in the house she owned
prior to the marriage. 100 She also used her salary to support her children,
one of whom was in college.' 0' When the parties divorced, she was in a
91. Id., 220 P.2d at 700-01. For other cases to the same effect, see Hildebrand v. Hildebrand,
41 Okla. 306, 137 P. 711 (1913); Sango v. Sango, 105 Okla. 166, 232 P. 49 (1924); Winslow v.
Winslow, 156 Okla. 260, 10 P.2d 666 (1932); Turlington v. Turlington, 189 Okla. 352, 117 P.2d
527 (1941); De Roin v. Da Roin, 198 Okla. 430, 179 P.2d 685 (1947); Jahn v. Jahn, 276 P.2d
225 (Okla. 1954).
92. 1976 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 154, § 1.
93. 639 P.2d 1257 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
94. Id.at 1263.
95. Id.
96. Id.at 1262.
97. Id.at 1259.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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better financial position than she had been prior to the marriage. 0 2 The
wife's need related solely to the financial drain caused by her children of a
previous marriage.103 Thus, the court stated, she did not suffer economically
because of the divorce. 1°4 It followed that the trial court was in error in
awarding her $5,000 in support alimony. 0
When the court held that need is the sole basis for the award for support
alimony, it continued a theme which had appeared earlier. In Seyller v.
Seyller,'06 the court reversed a $1200 alimony judgment.'07 The marriage
lasted only nine months. 08 The wife was a school teacher, who was capable
of earning her own living.' 9 After the separation, she once again lived
where she had resided before the marriage." 0 According to the court, the
$700 alimony pendente lite was all that she should receive."' In most of
the early cases in which the wife was denied alimony when the husband
was at fault, it was because she could not demonstrate an economic need
2
connected to the marriage.1
The Bowman court defined economic need as one resulting from "illness,
postponement of an education or other cause."" ' This idea has also been
expressed in earlier cases. In Conrad v. Conrad,"4 the parties divorced after
a five-year marriage. The husband, an osteopathic physician, had acquired
a new practice, a clinic, and a pharmacy in a new town during the marriage." 5 The wife, on the other hand, resigned her job as an auditor and
spent her time during the marriage tending to his children by a prior marriage
"while giving him the stability of a home. ' 6 The trial court did not award
8
the wife alimony." 7 This judgment, the supreme court held, was error."
"The earning capacity of the defendant [wife] was virtually destroyed by
the marriage, while the earning capacity of the plaintiff [husband] was
enhanced during this period."" 9 .The court awarded the wife $10,000 in
alimony. 12

102. Id. at 1262.

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 96 Okla. 135, 220 P. 626 (1923).

107. Id., 220 P. at 626.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Seyller v. Seyller, 96 Okla. 135, 220 P.2d 626 (1923); Seddicum v. Seddicum, 167 Okla.
420, 30 P.2d 156 (1934).
113. Bowman v. Bowman, 639 P.2d 1257, 1263 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
114. 471 P.2d 892 (Okla. 1969).
115. Id. at 893.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.

120. Id.
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Thus, it would seem that the need for alimony should be defined as an
economic disparity between the spouses that has occurred during the marriage, as a result of the marriage, or has been exacerbated by the marriage.
If the disparity has no relationship to the marriage, then no alimony should
be awarded. As the court noted in Bowman, the fact that the husband has
more money than the wife is not a basis for support alimony.' 2' If the trial
record contains no evidence of need, the reviewing court will reverse.'"
B. Measuring the Support Alimony Award
1.

The Trial Court's Discretion
Since the enactment of the new alimony statutes, the supreme court has
consistently affirmed the trial court's award of alimony. 23 The same cannot
be said about the court of appeals. Although that court has indicated the
standard of review for an alimony award is not the substitution of the
reviewing court's judgment for the trial court's, 24 it continues to modify
or reverse almost as many alimony judgments as it affirms.'25 Between 1987
and 1990, the court of appeals decided forty support alimony cases by
unpublished opinion. 26 In twenty-one of the cases, the court modified or
reversed the trial court and affirmed only nineteen cases. 27 This percentage
is somewhat higher than the general rate of modifications or reversals of
trial court decisions in domestic relations cases.1'8
2. The Scope of the Need Concept: Standard of Living
While all agree that the alimony recipient must show a marriage-related
need to receive support alimony, there is extreme disagreement as to how
that need should be measured. According to one theory, the alimony
recipient is only entitled to income sufficient enough to make a transition
to gainful employment. 29 In other jurisdictions, this concept is called rehabilitative alimony. 30 The other theory holds that upon showing need, an
121. Id. at 1262-63.
122. See Mastromonaco v. Mastromonaco, 751 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Okla. Ct. App. 1988).
123. See Henderson v. Henderson, 764 P.2d 156 (Okla. 1988); Ford v. Ford, 766 P.2d 950
(Okla. 1988); Rice v. Rice, 762 P.2d 925 (Okla. 1988); Johnson v. Johnson, 674 P.2d 539 (Okla.

1983); Harmon v. Harmoa, 770 P.2d I (Okla. 1983) (rehearing denied in 1988); Stansberry v.
Stansberry, 580 P.2d 147 (Okla. 1978) (reversing the court of appeals).
124. Garvey v. Garvey, 606 P.2d 618, 619 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
125. See, e.g., Horn v. Horn, 695 P.2d 561 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985) (modification); Charles v.
Charles, 713 P.2d 1050 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985) (modification); Agent v. Agent, 604 P.2d 862

(Okla. Ct. App. 1979) (affirnance); Primrose v. Primrose, 663 P.2d 755 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983)
(affirmance).
126. See Spector, The Hidden Law, An Analysis of the UnpublishedFamily Law Opinions of
the Court of Appeals and a Proposalfor Publication (pt. 1), OBA FA,.,. L. SEC. UPDATE, Mar.
31, 1991, at 1 (vol. 6, no. 1).
127. See id. (pt. 2), OBA FAm. L. SEC. UPDATE, June 30, 1991, at 13 (vol. 6, no. 2).
128. Id.

129. See, e.g., McDowell v. McDowell, 670 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Reback v.
Reback, 296 So. 2d 541 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).

130. See Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: MaritalDecisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 197; Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989).
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alimony recipient is entitled to sufficient income to continue living in the
same lifestyle that existed before the divorce. 3' Current Oklahoma cases
exhibit much confusion over the appropriate theory and its application.3 2
Prior to 1976, one of the factors considered in determining the size of
the alimony award was the standard of living the parties enjoyed prior to
marriage. In Dowdell v. Dowdell 33 the court stated that when the divorce
was granted because of the husband's fault, the wife was entitled to receive
alimony "in a sum more commensurate with the mode of living to which
she has become accustomed to as defendant's wife."' 3 4 In Durland v.
Durland,131 the supreme court relied on Dowdell and granted certiorari solely
to increase alimony from $36,000 to $48,000 based on the couple's standard
of living. 36 In Stansberry v. Stansberry,3 7 the court approved a support
alimony award of $240,000 because
it would be erroneous to limit the alimony award to the bare
necessary maintenance requirements, where, as here, there is full
justification for a much larger award. The determination of the
amount of alimony to be allowed in a divorce action requires
3
the consideration of the station in life of ... the parties.1 1
However, in the first post-Bowman opinion on support alimony, the
supreme court appeared to strike a different chord. In Johnson v. Johnson,139 the wife raised on appeal the failure of the trial court to award
support alimony. She had been married for thirty-two years, during which
she worked intermittently."4' She was not working at the time of trial.' 4'
Writing for a 5-3 majority, Justice Opala noted that the wife had received
property valued at $116,024, consisting of the homestead, an office building,
and a 90-acre undeveloped tract. 42 He set out the following rule: "Where
a substantial amount of spousal property is granted by the court, an alimony
claim must be supported by proof of excess monetary needs to cushion the
economic impact of transition and readjustment to gainful employment.
Alimony is based on demonstrated need." 4

131. While not necessarily advocating a sharing of earning capacity, the use of the concept of
rehabilitative alimony in long-term marriages is unmercilessly criticized in Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses of Limited Duration Alimony, 21 FAM. L.Q. 573 (1988).
132. Compare Rice v. Rice, 762 P.2d 925 (Okla. 1985) and Henderson v. Henderson, 764
P.2d 156 (Okla. 1985) with Ford v. Ford, 766 P.2d 950 (Okla. 1988).
133. 463 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1970).
134. Id. at 952.
135. 552 P.2d 1148 (Okla. 1976).
136. Id. at 1149.
137. 580 P.2d 147 (Okla. 1978).
138. Id. at 150 (emphasis in original).
139. 674 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1983).
140. Id. at 545-46.
141. Id.

142. Id.
143. Id. at 546 (emphasis in original).
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The burden of proof in support alimony cases lies with the person
requesting the alimony. 44 In Johnson the record was silent on (1)the cost
of maintaining the wife during the period of economic readjustment; (2)
the amount of income from the income-producing property set aside to her;
and (3) the length of time necessary for rehabilitation. 45 The supreme court
could not presume
need from a silent record, and therefore the trial court
46
was affirmed.
Justice Opala relied on two cases for the statement that alimony is based
on demonstrated need. In Weaver v. Weaver, 47 the parties had lived separately for several years. 48 They had entered into a separate maintenance
arrangement under 'Virginia law. 49 The husband was captured in Vietnam
and held prisoner. 5 0 Upon his release the wife sought a divorce and division
of his prisoner-of-war funds as either property division or alimony. 5' The
trial court's order awarding part of the fund as support alimony was reversed
by the court of appeals because there was no evidence of a "need for
support.' ' 5 2 In the other cited case, Kirkland v. Kirkland,'53 the wife could
do nothing but type slowly. 54 While this evidence clearly showed need, there
was no evidence indicating when, if ever, Ms. Kirkland could be economically rehabilitated. 5
Justice Opala did not cite or discuss any of the cases where the award
of alimony was based on the married couple's lifestyle. The language of
Johnson strongly suggested that the only measure of support alimony is to
ensure economic rehabilitation for the disadvantaged marital partner.
For the most part, after Johnson, the court of appeals accepted the
6 the trial court's
rehabilitative alimony theory. In Primrose v. Primrose,"1
refusal to award support alimony was affirmed because alimony is for need
only, and the wife had sufficient income from the property division award
to support herself.' 5 ' In Horn v. Horn, 58 the support alimony award was
reversed because there was no evidence in the record that the wife, a healthy
38-year-old woman, was in need. 5 9 The court also noted that the amount
awarded provided her with more income than the family of four lived on
before the divorce." Finally, in Charles v. Charles, 6' a $500 temporary
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 545.
Id.
Id.
545 P.2d 1305 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
Id. at 1306.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1308-09.
Id. at 1309.
488 P.2d 1222 (Okla. 1971).
Id. at 1227.
Id.
663 P.2d 755 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983).
Id. at 759.
695 P.2d 561 (Okbt. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 564.
Id.
713 P.2d 1048 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985).
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alimony award was reversed because the wife testified that she did not need
all of the money she removed from the couple's bank accounts for living
expenses.162 The court63also noted the wife's economic needs were not included in the record.
However, not all of the court of appeals cases in the years following
Johnson accept a rehabilitative alimony ideal. In Hubbard v. Hubbard,'"
the court of appeals doubled the trial court alimony award from $1000 a
month to $2000 a month for ten years. 65 This amount, the court said, fully
comported with the parties' standard of living prior to the divorce.66 The
court relied on Dowdell and stated that the trial court should consider the
mode of living to which the wife had become accustomed during marriage. 67
Johnson and the ideal of rehabilitative alimony was not mentioned.
The cause ctl~bre which focused the attention of the Oklahoma bar on
the issue of support alimony was Silverstein v. Silverstein.'68 The wife was
awarded property valued at $970,515.169 She was free of debt and was
receiving $1600 per month in child support. 70 The court also awarded her
alimony of $8300 a month for ten years.' 7 ' The wife appealed, contending
that the alimony award was insufficient. 72 While the court of appeals cited
upon need, it then noted that
Bowman to the effect that alimony depends
"need appears to have many meanings.' ' 173 The husband called the court's
attention to Johnson and suggested in his brief that an alimony award was
inappropriate. 74 However, the court stated that the husband did not appeal
the alimony award, and therefore the court could only consider Johnson as
part of the argument against increasing the alimony award. 75 Given the
context of the appeal, whether the alimony award should be increased
beyond $1 million, the court of appeals found the award proper. 76 The
court also noted that the alimony constituted only 19% of the husband's
monthly disposable income.'"
Following Silverstein, the supreme court added to the confusion with three
inconsistent cases. In Rice v. Rice, 78 decided on July 12, 1988, the court
dismissed an attempt by the wife to increase the amount of support alimony
as follows:
162. Id. at 1050.
163. Id.
164. 56 OKLA. B.J. 407 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985), withdrawn for other reasons, 56 OKLA. B.J.
1633 (Okla. 1985).
165. Id. at 409.
166. Id. at 408.
167. Id.

168. 748 P.2d 1004 (Okla.Ct. App. 1987).
169. Id.at 1006.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.at 1008.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 762 P.2d 925 (Okla. 1988).
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A claim for alimony for support must be supported by proof of
excess monetary needs to cushion the impact of the transition
from marriage and readjustment to gainful employment. The
decision to grant alimony for support is discretionary with the
trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal without a showing
that the court abused that discretion. Neither showing has been
made here. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.'"
However, in Ford v. Ford,8 0 decided on September 22, 1988, the court
opined:
The husband appeals the award of support alimony. The wife
asserts that the award of support alimony of $2,000.00 per month
for 24 months should not be reduced. The husband testified that
his income from the practice of law after deducting taxes was
$4,300.00 per month at the time of the divorce. In light of the
wife's monthly expenses and accustomed mode of living the award
cannot be construed as an abuse of discretion. The wife received
the benefit of an education while married, but has not been
employed, except for a short period, since the beginning of the
marriage. An education is relevant to determine the possibility
of employment, and a possibility of employment is to be considered in determining alimony. However, this award for 24 months
is not beyond the bounds of sound judicial discretion in the case
before us.' 8'
Finally, in Henderson v. Henderson,82 decided October 18, 1988, the court
appeared to return to the Johnson standard:
Wife in this case was awarded the sum of $57,000 in support
alimony payable at $2,000 per month for six months, $1,500 per
month for the next six months and $1,000 per month thereafter.
Wife indicated at trial that she had worked as a real estate broker
prior to the marriage and was reentering that business since the
last breakup of the marriage. Her claim for a greater alimony
award is simply that the present award is inadequate to maintain
the lifestyle to which she and her children by a previous marriage
are accustomed. Although her children appear to be adults, wife
appears to claim that both she and they should be supported to
the same degree by husband that they were prior to the divorce.
Wife's argument on this point does not indicate the nature of
her need for maintenance beyond the award already made to her,
nor does it recognize her own income producing capacity or the
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 928 (citations omitted).
766 P.2d 950 (Okla. 1988).
Id. at 954 (citations omitted).
764 P.2d 156 (Okla. 1988).
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time necessary to make the transition to self-support. In the
absence of such evidence we will presume the correctness of the
needs. See Johnson v. Johnson,
trial court's provision for wife's
83
674 P.2d 539 (Okla.1983).
The court of appeals in Wood v. Wood' 4 - the same panel as in
Silverstein - added further confusion. The parties were married for twenty86
The
seven years.'85 The husband was a successful financial consultant.
87
She raised the parties'
wife worked only briefly during the marriage.
children and helped care for the husband's relatives.18 8 The court noted that
she greatly assisted the husband socially and actively participated in school
and civic functions. 8 9 The trial court awarded the wife a divorce on the
ground of adultery and the husband a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.' 9° The wife was awarded substantial property division, propertydivision alimony, and $507,000 of support alimony payable over fifteen
years. ' 9'
With regard to support alimony, the husband argued that the wife failed
to prove sufficient need to justify the amount awarded.' 92 The court acknowledged that need of the recipient and the ability to pay control the
award of support alimony. 93 In this case, the court noted that the wife's
economic need grew out of the marriage because she had not been regularly
employed over the couple's twenty-seven-year marriage. 94 She had no job
training, and her college degree was twenty-seven years old. 95 While the
evidence was clear that she was entitled to support alimony, the issue was
whether she was entitled to over $500,000.
The court of appeals held that when need is shown, the party requesting
alimony is entitled to it in a sum "commensurate with the mode of living
to which she has been accustomed as a wife."' 96 The court cited the standardof-living cases of Dowdell v. Dowdell' 97 and Stansberry v. Stansberry"8 as
authoritative.199 It did not discuss, or even cite, the effect of the Johnson
opinion on the calculation of support alimony.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 160.
793 P.2d 1372 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990).
Id.at 1373.
Id.

187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.at 1374.
191. Id.
192. Id.at 1375-76.
193. Id.at 1376.
194. Id.
195. Id.

196. Id.
197. 463 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1969).
198. 580 P.2d 147 (Okla. 1978).
199. Wood, 793 P.2d at 1376. This division of the court of appeals reaffirmed its commitment
to lifestyle awards in Archer v. Archer, 813 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991). The court
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Thus, both the supreme court and the court of appeals have left the
bench and bar in disarray. It is apparent that the appellate courts do
subscribe to both rehabilitative and lifestyle approaches to alimony. A case
that attempts to determine when each approach applies is essential.
3.

Scope of the Need Concept: Income
from Property Division Alimony

In Johnson v. Johnson,2°° the court held that in measuring need, it is
necessary to look at the amount of income from income-producing property
set aside to the wife. 20' One oft-raised issue is whether a court should deny
support alimony if a spouse is receiving a sufficient amount of property
division alimony each month to cover that spouse's needs. In Carter v.
Carter,20 2 the husband agreed at the time of the divorce in 1984, to pay
$360,000 in support alimony at $3000 per month for 120 months.20 3 He also
agreed to pay property division alimony beginning in 1987 at a rate of
$5,772.41 per month, with a total of $502,000.2 On December 30, 1986,
the husband filed a motion to modify the amount of support alimony,
claiming that the wife's receipt of property division alimony constituted a
change in circumstances which would justify modifying or eliminating support alimony.20s The trial court reduced the amount of support alimony;
however, it extended the number of payments. 206 The trial court's decision
was affirmed on appeal.?07
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to consider property
division payments when determining the wife's need for support alimony. 208
The court held that these were not income but rather monetary payments
in lieu of the prope.rty she should have received. 209 The trial court could
look to the income earning potential of the property division alimony award
but it would be improper to require the wife to liquidate her property to
210
provide for her support.
Carteris the court's first attempt to grapple with the precise point. Courts
should be consistent when considering the need for alimony and the ability
to pay alimony. Thus, when determining whether the proposed recipient of
alimony has received sufficient marital property to cushion the economic

said that the pre-divorce standard of living had long been a factor in setting alimony. It then
extended that factor to child support and approved a trial court award in excess of the top
amount listed in 43 OIA. STAT. § 119 (Supp. 1990). Archer, 813 P.2d at 1061.
200. 674 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1983).
201. Id. at 546.
202. No. 70,652 (Oda. Ct. App. Tulsa Dec. 19, 1990).
203. Id., slip op. at 2.
204. Id., slip op. at 4.
205. Id., slip op. at 3.
206. Id., slip op. at 3.
207. Id., slip op. at 1.
208. Id., slip op. at 3.
209. Id., slip op. at 4.
210. Id., slip op. at 4-5.
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transition to single status, the court should only consider the income produced by the property, which would alleviate the future need for support.
To the extent that the payor of alimony is not required to liquidate any of
his share of marital property to pay alimony, principles of equality require
that the recipient should not be required to liquidate any of her marital
property in order to provide for daily living expenses. It should therefore
be error to consider the receipt of property division alimony in determining
whether support alimony should be ordered.21'
4. Measuring the Alimony Award: Proving Need
and the Ability to Pay
In addition to showing need on the part of the recipient, it is necessary
to show that the payor has the ability to pay alimony. 2 2 The court of
appeals will examine the entire record to determine if the amount ordered
is beyond the payor's ability. In Carroll v. Carroll,23 the amount ordered
came to 57% of the payor's estimated gross income and left him only
$1,083 for taxes and his own maintenance. 2 4 The court modified the alimony
downward. 215 The court approved imputing income to the payor to determine
his ability to pay. 216 While it is proper to do so, counsel should carefully
base the imputation on prior labor experience. Thus, in Carroll the trial
court heard witnesses concerning the amount that the husband could earn
28
based on his prior earning record. 2 7 However, in Sugerman v. Sugerman,
the trial court imputed a $30,000 annual salary to the wife in order to
determine whether she needed alimony. 219 The court of appeals held that
this practice was improper because the wife had no history of earning that
amount. Indeed, the wife had never worked at all, and the figure was based
on her testimony about speculative future earnings.2 ,0
In considering available funds for the alimony award, the attorney must
distinguish between those funds available for property division and those
211. Otherwise, the appellate courts have shown a willingness to review the entire record to
determine whether the evidence realistically indicates that the level of support alimony awarded

was warranted. For example, in Braatz v. Braatz, No. 71,458 (Okla. Ct. App. Tulsa, June 26,
1990), the court reduced the alimony award because the wife's estimate of her expenses was
inflated. She included the fair rental value of a residence that was part of the marital property
awarded to her and an amount for child care when her parents cared for the child. In fact her
parents did not charge for caring for the child and she did not have to pay rent for the property
she owned. For a further discussion of how to prove need and ability to pay, see C. Thompson,
supra note 2.
212. For an excellent discussion, see C. Thompson, supra note 2.
213. No. 71,233 (Okla. Ct. App. Oklahoma City Aug. 21, 1990).

214. Id., slip op. at 5.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id., slip op. at 4.
218. No. 71,628 (Okla. Ct. App. Tulsa Feb. 6, 1990), cert. denied, 61 OKuA. B.J. 1529 (Okla.
1990) (Opala, Hargrave, JJ., dissenting).
219. Id., slip op. at 5.
220. Id., slip op. at 6-7.
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funds available for support alimony and child support. This rule is particularly true for government benefits. In some cases, Congress or the Oklahoma legislature has declared that the funds cannot be divided as marital
property.' ' However, Congress will often allow the same funds to be used
to support the recipient's family.m Each government program must be
separately examined to determine whether the benefits may be used as a
source of funds for alimony. Thus, social security disability benefits and
workers' compensation funds are available. 22 However, funds in the Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System cannot be executed upon to
satisfy an alimony judgment.2 4
One argument that often arises when determining ability to pay occurs
when marital property that is awarded to a spouse in equitable distribution
is then considered as a source of income in determining that spouse's support
alimony obligation. An asset that produces an income stream - such as a
pension or accounts receivable - is the type of asset that most frequently
produces a claim of "double dipping."
In Holeman v. Holeman,m the wife's alimony award was reduced on
appeal from $200 to $90 per month and the gross amount from $16,600 to
$13,410.226 The wife also contended that she should receive a portion of the
husband's retirement benefits.227 The husband was due to retire in two years
from the postal service with a monthly benefit of $260. 22 The court denied
the wife's request?22" It noted that the husband would be obligated to pay
the wife $90 in support alimony.? 0 If the pension were divided equally
between the parties, the husband would only have $130 a month. 23' If he
were required to pay the $90 alimony out of his share of the pension
benefits, he would be left with only $40 a month. 2 2 Obviously, this would
be grossly inequitable. The court held:
If the retirement fund is divided at this time as jointly acquired
property this would in effect destroy plaintiff's future livelihood
221. See, e.g., Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989) (Congress has not authorized state
courts to divide military cnd veteran disability benefits as marital property).
222. See, e.g., Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619 (1987) (military and veteran disability benefits may
be used as a source of alimony and child support).
223. Meadows v. Meadows, 619 P.2d 598 (Okla. 1980) (social security disability benefits and
workers' compensation funds available for alimony); Commons v. Bragg, 183 Okla. 122, 80 P.2d
287 (1930) (workers' compensation funds available for alimony); Huskey v. Batts, 530 P.2d 1375
(Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (social security disability benefits available for alimony).

224. Udall v. Udall, 613 P.2d 742 (Okla. 1980); see also Sessions v. Sessions, 525 P.2d 1269
(Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (court may not order National Service Life Insurance policy to be kept
in force on behalf of wife until alimony judgment is paid).
225. 459 P.2d 611 (Okla. 1969).
226. Id.at 613.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.at 614.
230. Id.
231. Id.at 613-14.
232. Id.at 614.
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and means of complying with the alimony award. The trial
court obviously took into consideration the retirement fund in
regard to setting an award for alimony out of plaintiff's future
income or earning capacity. It would be unfair to divide the
retirement fund and then make a provision for payment of the
majority of the alimony award out of his monthly retirement
233
income.

This solution is clearly correct when considered as a matter of support

alimony. If the trial judge divided the pension, the husband would not
have the ability to pay, and the support alimony award would have to be
vacated. On the other hand, if the pension in Holeman had been divided,
it is doubtful whether the wife would have qualified for support alimony.
23 4
The Holeman decision was later misinterpreted. In Baker v. Baker,
the court held that Holeman required that the pension could only be
utilized for support alimony purposes and thus could not be considered
marital property. 235 Baker was departed from in Carpenterv. Carpenter,23 6
which held that the husband's pension and profit sharing plan was marital
property. 23 7 The Carpenter trial court awarded the pension plan to the
husband with offsetting benefits to the wife. 238 The value of the pension
and profit sharing plan was $163,278, which constituted over 50% of the
value of the husband's portion of the marital estate. 239 The wife was also
awarded support alimony of $162,000, payable at $1500 a month. 240 Both
the property division and the alimony award were upheld on appeal.24'
When reviewing prior Oklahoma case law, the court in Carpenter indicated that Holeman is authority for two propositions: (1) a pension may
not be divided as marital property and utilized as the basis for an alimony
award; and (2) "if the husband's financial circumstances are such that a
division of a pension as jointly acquired property would destroy his future
livelihood and means of complying with an alimony award, it would be
unfair to divide the pension and then make provision for the payment of
the majority of an alimony award out of his monthly retirement in242
come. 1
However, in Greer v. Greer,243 Justice Lavender correctly noted that a
reading of Holeman indicates that only the second proposition was before

233. Id.
234. 546 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1976), overruled, Carpenter v. Carpenter, 657 P.2d 646 (Okla.

1983).
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 1326.
657 P.2d 646 (Okla. 1983).
Id. at 650-51.
Id. at 649.
Id.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 653.
Id.
807 P.2d 791 (Okla. 1991).
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the court. 244 Indeed, in Carpenter itself, the court's affirmation of the
support alimony award required that the husband pay the support alimony
award out of the pension and profit-sharing receipts.245 Thus, the language
and the result in Carpenter are at odds as to whether dual consideration
is allowed in Oklahoma.
In Greer the wife had returned to court to claim a portion of her exhusband's military pension.2 4 6 The husband argued that the trial court had
"taken the pension into account" in originally awarding support alimony;
hence, the pension could not now be divided as marital property. 247 The
court disagreed because the record did not indicate that by dividing the
24 8
pension the husband would be unable to comply with the alimony award.
Greer should categorically end the argument that an asset cannot be
divided as marital property and at the same time provide support alimony.
Thus, the practice of some judges of either dividing accounts receivable
as marital property or providing support alimony has no basis. Instead,
the issues of property division and support alimony should both be examined on their own merits.
The following suggested method depends upon how the pension or
profit-sharing plan is divided.
(a) Unmatured pension and profit-sharing plan awarded to employeespouse with offsetting property awarded to the non-employee spouse.
In this situation the pension, usually a defined-benefit plan, 249 is awarded
to the employee-spouse at its present value.75° The non-employee spouse
receives offsetting property, usually equal to one-half of the value of the
marital portion of the pension from the rest of the marital estate. The
value of the marital property received by the non-employee spouse may
be considered, but only to determine the amount of the support alimony
244. Id. at 795.
245. Carptenter v. Cacpenter, 657 P.2d 646, 651 (Okla. 1983). Justices Barnes and Opala
noted this point in their dissent in Carpenter.Id. at 653-54. The basis of their disagreement with
the majority was a perceived double charge against the pension. They took the position that a
pension could be found to be marital property and divided, or be found to be separate property
and utilized as the basis for a support alimony award, but not both. Id.
246. Greer, 807 P.2 at 795. The court found that the prohibition against retroactive modification of property division awards did not apply in this case because the parties had otherwise
acquiesced in their settlement agreement. Id.
247. Id.

248. Id.
249. A defined-benefit plan is the most common type of pension plan. Generally, the employer
is obligated to provide a certain monthly or annual benefit upon retirement which is paid from
the date of retirement until the date of death. The benefit to be paid upon retirement will be
arrived at by the use of a mathematical formula. Frequently the formula will be a percentage of
"relevant compensation" multiplied by the number of years of credited employment. Generally,
in a defined benefit plan, a separate account does not exist for each participant. The employer
contributes periodically to one large fund from which all benefits are paid. For a discussion of
employment benefits in property division, see R. SPECTOR, FAMILY LAW: OKLAHOMA STYLE 37491 (1991).
250. See the discussion in Pulliam v. Pulliam, 796 P.2d 296 (Okla. 1990), and Spector, Methods
of Distributing Pension Benefits, OBA FAM. L. SEC. UPDATE, Oct. 1989, at 6 (vol. 4, no. 3).
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to the extent that the property produces income in the future, which would
alleviate the need for support. However, the value of the pension awarded
to the employee-spouse should not be considered when determining that
spouse's ability to pay support alimony. The rationale for not considering
the value of the pension for the employee-spouse is because the pension
is not presently producing income that can be used to pay support alimony.
Property that does not produce current income should not be considered
in either the need for support alimony or the ability to pay support
alimony. The reason has nothing to do with "double-dipping" but with
the basis for support alimony.
Assume that support alimony is awarded to the non-employee spouse,
and during the time that alimony is to be paid, the employee spouse retires
and begins to receive the pension. In a modification proceeding, should
the receipt of the pension benefits be considered? The answer to that
question depends on the issue before the court. If the recipient spouse is
contending that the receipt of the pension is itself a change of circumstances under title 43, section 134(E) that justifies an upward modification
in support alimony, the answer should be "no." If the receipt of the
pension increases the income of the payor spouse, then, by analogy to
child support, an increase in the payor's income is not, by itself, such a
change of circumstances that would justify an increase in support ali251
mony.
The more common scenario is when the payor contends that retirement
has reduced the income available for support alimony, and therefore a
change of circumstances has occurred. However, if the payor's retirement
was foreseen, it should have been calculated into the length and level of
support alimony. Retirement under those circumstances would not constitute a change of conditions. This result is absolutely necessary because if
retirement constituted a change of conditions, and if dual consideration
of a pension were generally prohibited, practically all support alimony
would end at the retirement of the employee-spouse. If the payor's retirement could not have been foreseen and is not for the purpose of avoiding
the payment of support alimony, then, if the substitute of the pension for
salaried earnings substantially reduces the income available to the payor,
the reduced income of the payor
a change of circumstances may exist, and
25 2
may result in a lower alimony award.
If either the recipient or the payor of alimony can show a change of
circumstance - apart from the contemplated retirement of the payor that would justify modification of support alimony under section 134(E),
then the receipt of pension income can and should be considered in
251. Cf. Wells v. Wells, 648 P.2d 1223 (Okla. 1983). In Colbert v. Wilson, No. 73,257 (Okla.
Ct. App. Oklahoma City Apr. 30, 1991), the court indicated that child support modification
cases should be persuasive in interpreting § 134(E).
252. Cf. Wilson v. Wilson, 738 P.2d 1382 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (substantial decrease in
supporting parent's income constitutes a change of circumstances justifying reducing child sup-

port).
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determining the level of support alimony. Should the recipient spouse
demonstrate that the need for alimony has increased, the next issue is
whether the payor-spouse has the ability to pay. Income currently being
received from the pension and profit-sharing plan is certainly relevant in
determining the level of support alimony. Conversely, if the payor of the
alimony can demonstrate that the need for support alimony has diminished,
then the level of the payor's disposable income, including pension benefits,
is also relevant to the amount of support alimony.
(b) Unmatured pension and profit-sharingplan valued and divided but
distribution postponed until received or, under a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO),253 until earliestretirement date of employee-spouse.
Under this method, the pension is valued and the division of the marital
portion is accomplished. However, neither party receives any portion of
the pension at the time of the decree. Income from the pension will be
received by the parties when the employee-spouse retires and begins to
draw benefits. If a QDRO is used, then benefits may be received at
different times by the spouses. The non-employee spouse may receive
benefits at the earliest retirement age of the employee-spouse, but the
employee-spouse does not draw benefits until actual retirement.
When this method of dividing the pension is used, the pension is
irrelevant for the present setting of support alimony. Because neither
spouse is receiving benefits, the value of the pension may not be used
either to compute the need for support alimony or the ability to pay
support alimony.
When the alimony-recipient spouse begins to receive benefits from the
pension plan at the employee-spouse's earliest retirement, does this receipt
constitute a change of circumstances under section 134(E)? The answer to
this question should be "no." At the time of the divorce, the trial court
presumably had before it the information concerning the present and future
need of the recipient of alimony and the ability of the employee-spouse
to pay. The future receipt of pension benefits should have been considered
when determining the length and scale of the alimony payments. The
receipt of pension benefits by either party is not a new matter unforeseen
at the time of the original decree. It is a future event that was known
when the decree was pronounced and should be an essential element of
the support alimony calculation.

253. A full discussion of the methods of dividing a pension plan in a divorce proceeding is
beyond the scope of this article. However, if the parties' desire to have payments made by the
pension plan directly to the employee's ex-spouse, the terms of the Retirement Equity Act of
1984 (Pub. L. No. 98-397) are applicable. See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 29 U.S.C. § 1052
(Supp. 11 1984). The parties will have to draft a Domestic Relations Order for the trial judge to
approve. If it is then approved by the administrator of the pension plan it will become a QDRO
and the employee's ex-spcuse will receive benefits directly from the plan. See Miers, St. Ville &
Schaunaman, The Division of Pension Benefits in Divorce, "You Can Have the Condo, And
I'll Take a QDRO, 57 Oa.A. B.J. 2601 (1986).
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The utilization of retirement benefits in the case of an unrelated change
of circumstances, including the unforeseen retirement of the employeespouse, should be determined as in the first scenario.
(c) Maturedpension and profit-sharingbenefits distributedaccording to
a percentage of the total benefit currently being received.
This situation occurs when the divorce is granted at the time the pension
is in pay-out status. The usual method of dividing the marital portion of
the pension is to allocate to each spouse a percentage of the monthly
benefit. Each spouse is then receiving income from the pension on a
monthly basis. The amount of the monthly benefit received by each spouse
should be included in the alimony calculations. After the benefit has been
included, there may still exist a need for support alimony. The amount of
the pension benefit awarded to the paying spouse should be included when
determining whether that spouse has the ability to pay support alimony.
The misnomer "double-dipping" should be abolished because it inhibits
analysis. The actual issue to be determined is whether there is a need for
support alimony and whether there is an ability to pay support alimony.
Pension and profit-sharing benefits should be considered when reviewing
both the need and the ability to pay. To the extent that pension benefits
currently contribute to the income stream of either spouse, the benefits
should be considered when determining the need for and amount of support
alimony. Now that Greer has eradicated the misperception concerning the
Holeman decision, these issues may be squarely addressed.
5.

The Alimony Award

Currently an alimony award is normally a money judgment. The Oklahoma statute, section 121, provides that alimony may be awarded out of
real or personal property, or in the form of a money judgment. 2 4 A
number of cases have approved the award of specific property as support
alimony. 255 In earlier times, awarding real property to the wife was the
26
normal method of supplying alimony.
6.

The Relationship to Property Division Alimony

In 1965, the Oklahoma legislature created what is now title 43, section
134.257 In 1967, it added section B, which, at the time of enactment,
allowed the trial court the discretion to designate, at the time of the
254. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 121 (1981).
255. See Mabray v. Mabray, 550 P.2d 997 (Okla. 1976) (trial court awarded the wife a life
estate in the husband's separate property); Fulton v. Fulton, 460 P.2d 114 (Okla. 1969) (trial
court may award the wife a life estate in the husband's separate property); Clark v. Clark, 460
P.2d 936 (Okla. 1969) (trial court can award the beneficial interest in an insurance policy as
alimony); Harris v. Harris, 606 P.2d 619 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980) (court awards wife the homestead
as support alimony).
256. See Hughes v. Hughes, 131 Okla. 33, 267 P. 620 (1928); Doutt v. Doutt, 73 Okla. 213,
175 P. 740 (1918); Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 41 Okla. 306, 137 P. 711 (1913).
257. See 1965 Okla. Sess. Laws § 4.
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original decree, those periodic payments that were payments for support
and were in lieu of a division of property. Payments designated for a
division of property were to continue until paid. Property division alimony
payments cannot be modified 2 8 and do not terminate at the death of
either the payor or the payee. 2 9
Prior to 1979, the trial court could largely determine without limitation
which payments were for property and which were to be designated alimony.
In 1979 this method changed. The legislature amended section 134 and
required the trial court to distinguish between property division payments
and support payments. 260 The trial court can no longer designate payments
that are properly for support as property to escape modifiability.
This statutory change has occasionally escaped consideration by the court
of appeals. In two recent cases, Savage v. Savage26' and Hughes v. Hughes,262
the court struggled with an unorthodox support alimony award. The trial
judge awarded to the wife the following:
Defendant [husband] is ordered to pay Plaintiff's educational
expenses for tuition, books and fees in a sum not to exceed
$4,000 per year for four of the next seven years, such years to
be Plaintiff's choice. Such payment shall be made directly to the
institution of higher learning which is chosen by Plaintiff, or to
26
the entity which sells the books.
This provision was attacked by the husband on appeal as a support
alimony provision which violated Oklahoma's settled policy in requiring
alimony to be in a sum certain. 264 The husband contended that the amount
might be considerably less than $4000.265 The amount could vary depending
on where the wife went to college.
The court of appeals ignored both briefs on this issue and struck out on
its own. It found that the sum certain rule did not apply because the
monetary award was not support alimony. 266 The court stated that the decree
did not designate the amount to be paid as support and that such designation
could only be made at the time of the entering of the original decree. 267
Because the trial court did not specifically designate the award as support,
the court of appeals, citing Diment v. Diment,26 decided that it must be a
258. See, e.g., Clifton v. Clifton, 801 P.2d 693 (Okla. 1990); Barth v. Barth, 803 P.2d 1117
(Okla. 1990).
259. Tiger v. Estate of Ackers, 554 P.2d 1213 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Thomas v. Thomas,
518 P.2d 1294 (Okla. Cr. App. 1973).
260. 1979 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 278, § 1.
261. No. 72,062 (Okla. Ct. App. Tulsa Apr. 30, 1991).
262. No. 71,886 (Okla. Ct. App. Tulsa Apr. 23, 1991).
263. Savage, No. '12, 62, slip op. at 4.
264. Id., slip op. at 3-4.
265. Id., slip op. at 4.
266. Id., slip op. at 5.
267. Id., slip op. at 4.
268. 531 P.2d 1071 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
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property division award. 269 The court concluded that, as in Diment, the
award for educational expenses was for the wife's contributions to the
marriage, which enabled the husband to finish his education and enhance
20
his earning capacity.
The opinion of the court of appeals is misplaced and perverts settled
Oklahoma statutory and case law. The court's first mistake was concluding
that the award must be a property award since it was not designated as
support. This court's conclusion is supported by cases like Diment and Shea
"
v. Shea.27
' These cases, however, were based upon the pre-1979 version of
section 134(A). 27 2 In Diment and Shea, the court was concerned with a trial
court decree that did not designate the nature of the payment. 273 The statute,
at that time, did not require that the payment be designated as either
property or support, but only that the court could so designate. The holding
of both cases was that an undesignated award would be considered as a
property payment.274
In Colvert v. Colvert,271 the same result occurred. The husband and wife
were divorcing in the husband's last year of medical school. 276 The divorce
decree contained a judgment for alimony "as property division and in
settlement of all of her property rights against the plaintiff, in the total
sum of $35,000. 1277 The supreme court, specifically approving the decree,
noted that it could have designated the wife's alimony as property settlement
278
rather than support.
These cases sparked a legislative response. 279 The statute now requires the
trial court, at the time of original decree, to state plainly which payment is
support and which payment is property. This amended section was before
the court in the well-known case of Hubbard v. Hubbard.20 The court in
Hubbard remanded the case to the trial court to determine the value of the
wife's direct contributions to the husband's medical career.2 1' She was to
be awarded these contributions as restitutionary alimony. 2 2 The court also
requested the trial court to reconsider the issue of support alimony. 283 The
court noted that in Colvert it held that the trial court could, at the time of

269. Savage, No. 72,062, slip op. at 5; see also Diment, 531 P.2d at 1072.
270. Savage, No. 72,062, slip op. at 5.
271. 537 P.2d 417 (Okla. 1975).
272. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1289 (1968).
273. Diment, 531 P.2d at 1074; Shea, 537 P.2d at 418.
274. Diment, 531 P.2d at 1073-74; Shea, 537 P.2d at 419.
275. 568 P.2d 623 (Okla. 1977), overruled, Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
276. Id. at 624.
277. Id. at 625.
278. Id.
279. See 1979 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 278, § 1.
280. 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
281. Id. at 752.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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the decree, designate all or a portion of each alimony payment as support
or alimony pertadning to a division of property. 284 It then stated:
Our holding in that case should not be read to mean that a court
can consider the future earnings of a spouse in setting the amount
of alimony, then designate the alimony, payments based on future
income as property division alimony. Insofar as Colvert, supra,
appears to stand for that proposition, it is overruled. 211
Since Colvert was based on Diment, Shea, and the repealed version of
section 134(A), those cases should likewise be considered overruled on this
issue.
In Savage and Hughes, the court of appeals was clearly incorrect in
relying on Diment to determine that non-designated payments must be
considered property. Prior court of appeals cases indicate that when the
trial court fails to follow the statute and designate the nature of each
payment, the proper procedure would be to construe the decree or agreement
to determine whether the payments were meant to be property division or
support alimony. 216 If the payments are to be made out of future earnings,
they must be specified as support alimony and not as property division. In
Savage, it is clear that the payment of the education expenses is to come
from the husband'; future earnings. 217 It is not addressed as a division of
current assets, i.e., as a property division provision. 21
The court of appeals also attempted to further justify the award by
indicating that it was for the wife's support of the husband's education. 28 9
The court cited to Diment's finding that the "alimony" award was justified
on the efforts of the wife in supporting her husband while he obtained his
education. 290 Awards to one spouse for efforts spent in furthering the
education of the other spouse are presently governed by Hubbard v.
2 9' and
Hubbard
not by Diment. In Hubbard, the court noted the marriage
possessed few assets because most of the marital funds went toward Dr.
Hubbard's education. 292 The court further stated that it was not powerless
to do equity simply because the divorce occurred at the beginning of Dr.
Hubbard's professional career. 29 The equitable "restitutionary" award occurred because the divorce happened before the accumulation of a substan284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See, e.g., Johnston v. Griffith, 675 P.2d 1038, 1040 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).
287. Savage v. Savage, No. 72,062, slip op. at 5 (Okla. Ct. App. Tulsa Apr. 30, 1991).
288. Indeed, if this is property division, then the trial judge was incorrect in requiring that
the husband make the rayments directly to the educational institution. The wife is entitled to
have the payments made directly to her. The trial court may direct one party to pay a debt as
part of the property division but it cannot set aside part of the property for third parties.
Williams v. Williams, 4211 P.2d 218 (Okla. 1967); Roberts v. Roberts, 357 P.2d 980 (Okla. 1960).
289. Savage, No. 72,062, slip op. at 5.
290. Id.
291. 603 P.2d 747 (O.a. 1979).
292. Id. at 751.
293. Id.
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tial marital estate.94 The court allowed Ms. Hubbard a fair return on her
investment. 295 That amount consisted of direct contributions to Dr.
Hub296
bard's education plus amounts representing interest and inflation.
The Savage v. Savage facts did not justify an equitable award to Ms.
Savage for her support of her husband's education. First, Ms. Savage's
sacrifices for her husband's education occurred in the first three years of a
seventeen-year marriage. In contrast, Ms. Hubbard supported her husband
throughout the marriage. The court specifically noted that the divorce
occurred before Dr. Hubbard had embarked on his medical career. In
Diment, the husband was in school the entire fifteen years. The wife
supported him as he went from an eleventh-grade education through medical
school. Dr. Diment had been practicing only two years before he filed for
divorce. In both Diment and Hubbard the divorce came before there had
been any marital accumulation. In Savage, the total marital estate was very
large. The wife received in alimony and property division almost
$250,000.
2
It clearly appears that she received a return on her investment. 97
Second, even if Ms. Savage was entitled to an award to compensate her
for aiding in her husband's education, the court incorrectly measured it.
Under Hubbard, the wife is entitled only to her direct expenses plus interest
and inflation. There is nothing in the Savage record to suggest that the
award for Ms. Savage's future education is based on her direct contributions
to Mr. Savage's education.
Third, if the award was for Ms. Savage's efforts, it should have been
paid directly to her. She is the party entitled to the restitution and not an
educational institution. The court of appeals decision that the educational
award is a property award is clearly incorrect.
IV. The PeculiarProblem of the Alimony "Cap"
Oklahoma law requires that a money judgment alimony award be set in
a definite amount - a sum certain. 298 Historically, an alimony award that
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 752.
297. In another case, the court of appeals had concluded that a wife in the position of Ms.
Savage could not receive a Hubbardaward. In Hubbard v. Hubbard, 56 OrA. B.J. 407 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1985), withdrawn for other reasons, 56 OK.LA. B.J. 1633 (Olda. 1985) (not the same
Hubbard!), the husband, a retinal ophthalmologist had practiced for five years, and the couple
had accumulated a marital estate well over $600,000. The court concluded that no restitutionary
alimony should be granted to the wife. Id. at 410. This decision is in accord with the majority
of cases in the country. See Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) (thirty year marriage;
"present earnings and business assets provide a more accurate measure of the true worth of the
wife's investment in husband's degree"); Nelson v. Nelson, 736 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1987) (no
award when wife worked to support husband for first two years of a 17-year marriage); Martin
v. Martin, 358 N.W.2d 793 (S.D. 1984) (reimbursement alimony inappropriate when parties had
reaped advantage of husband's law degree for fourteen years); see also CAL. Cirv. CODE § 4000.3
(West Supp. 1988) (presumption that the community has substantially benefitted from the
advanced education, if education occurred more than ten years before filing of divorce petition).
298. Steincamp v. Steincamp, 593 P.2d 495 (Okla. 1979).
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depended upon a contingency was void. 2 99 One of the major issues today is
whether Oklahoma law still requires a sum certain.
Oklahoma law was not always so. Prior to statehood, Arkansas law
prevailed. Under Arkansas law, alimony could not be set in a definite
amount. Support alimony was required to be periodic and would terminate
upon certain contingencies. 3°° After statehood, our divorce law was derived
from Kansas law. The original version of section 121 provided that the
court could decree "to her such sum of money, payable either in gross or
in installments .

. . . ",1 This

statutory phrase was at issue in Dutton v.

Dutton.A02 The husband filed to modify his support alimony award because
his ex-wife had remarried 0 3 The court noted that previous Kansas decisions
had held that a trial court had no power to modify an alimony award. 3 4
The rationale for non-modifiability was that alimony had to be set in a
certain sum.0 5 The court further noted that if the amount is not set in a
fixed sum, it was not alimony within the context of the statute and therefore
was modifiable.: 6 Thus, the original adoption of the "sum certain" rule
was that alimony could not be modified because it was set in a sum. A
possible implication of Dalton could have been that if alimony was not set
in a sum it could be modified. If this implication had come to pass,
Oklahoma would have had two different types of alimony: that set in a
sum which could riot be modified, and that not set in a sum which could
be modified. This would have corresponded to the periodic-permanent and
alimony "in gross" found in all other statesY07
However, Oklahoma did not take this approach. The court continued to
focus on the word "sum" in the statute. The next case, Boulanger v.
Boulanger,3°s interpreted the Dutton case to mean that an alimony award
310
must be set in a definite amount. 309 If it does not do so, it is "void.1
Since the Boulanger award was not set in a definite amount, the court
concluded that the award must be for child support.31' In other cases, the
court concluded that if the amount was set in a sum certain, it was alimony
312
even if the clause granting the money referred to the "wife and children.
299. Vanderslice v. Vanderslice, 195 Okla. 496, 159 P.2d 560 (1945).
300. See Ecker v. Ecker, 22 Okla. 873, 98 P. 918, 920 (1908); Adams v. Adams, 30 Okla.
327, 120 P. 566, 568 (1911).
301. O, A. REV. LAWS § 4869 (1910).
302. 97 Okla. 234, 223 P. 149 (1923).
303. Id., 223 P. at 149.
304. Id., 223 P. at 150.
305. Id., 223 P. at 150-51.
306. Id.
307. See H. CLARK, Domsic RmATioNs 655 (2nd ed. 1987).
308. 127 Okla. 103, 260 P. 49 (1927).

309. Id., 260 P. at 50.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 50-51; see also Hadley v. Hadley, 129 Okla. 219, 280 P. 1097, 1098 (1928). In

separate maintenance actions alimony is based upon the spouse's current needs and not future
needs. As a result the court may not set the amount of alimony as a fixed sum. The amount
must be periodic and may be modified based upon the needs and conditions of the recipient
spouse. Hughes v. Hughes, 363 P.2d 155, 157 (Okla. 1961).
312. Alcorn v. Alcorn, 187 Okla. 196, 102 P.2d 121, 123 (1940).
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In later cases, the court adopted an additional rationale to explain why
support alimony must be in a sum certain. 1 3 It determined that the alimony
314
judgment could attain definite finality, just like any other judgment.
3 15
Therefore, it had to be set in a definite amount. The court then determined
that alimony judgments must be measured by the same rule as to finality,
and "that in no case does the husband have a right to modification of the
alimony judgment after the same has become final. ' 316 This rationale also
31 7
required that the monthly amount be as immutable as the total amount.
The court soon was faced with issues interpreting the term "definite
amount." The court concluded that if the total amount of alimony could
be calculated from the face of the decree, it was not indefinite. 318 Alternatively, if the total amount cannot be calculated from the decree, the alimony
award is uncertain and must be stricken. 31 9 The classic example is Vanderslice
v. Vanderslice.3 20 The decree provided that the husband was to pay $50 a
month until the youngest child became of age. 321 The judge failed to provide
for the contingency that the youngest child might die before majority. It
therefore followed that the alimony award was indefinite and must be
3
recalculated. 2
The sum certain rule does not apply if one spouse is awarded a specific
asset in lieu of alimony. For example, in Mayhue v. Mayhue323 the court
upheld an award of a percentage of royalties from an oil lease as support
3
alimony. 24
Finding an alimony award to be indefinite and therefore void does not
relieve the payor of responsibility. In Oder v. Oder,32 the court vacated an
order requiring the husband to pay the wife alimony of $75 for an indefinite
313. Gilcrease v. Gilcrease, 186 Okla. 451, 98 P.2d 906, 907 (1939); Murphy v. McElroy, 185
Okla. 369, 92 P.2d 369, 371 (1939).
314. Gllcrease, 98 P.2d at 907.
315. Id.; see also Murphy v. McElroy, 185 Okla. 369, 92 P.2d 369 (1939) (the sum certain
rule is required because it is sound public policy that "judgment liens should be definite and
certain in amount.").
316. Gilcrease, 98 P.2d at 907; see also Bishop v. Bishop, 194 Okla. 209, 148 P.2d 472, 475
(1944); Bowen v. Bowen, 182 Okla. 14, 76 P.2d 900, 902 (1938).
317. Canada v. Canada, 190 Okla. 203, 121 P.2d 989, 990 (1942).
318. Javine v. Javine, 134 Okla. 283, 273 P. 267, 268 (1929).
319. Vanderslice v. Vanderslice, 195 Okla. 496, 159 P.2d 560 (1945).
320. 195 Okla. 496, 159 P.2d 560 (1945).
321. Id. at 561.
322. Id. at 562. Another indefinite award occurred in May v. May, 596 P.2d 536 (Okla. 1979).
The wife was awarded a possessory interest in the homestead. The couple remained as tenantsin-common in the homestead. She was to retain the home until she married or died. The husband
was to pay taxes and other expenses. The court found the gross amount of alimony indefinite
and the provision on terminating upon death or remarriage violative of the finality rule. Id. at

540.
323. 706 P.2d 890 (Okla. 1985).
324. Id. at 894; see also Clark v. Clark, 460 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1969) (an alimony award requiring

husband to continue his wife as beneficiary on an insurance policy was upheld); Frensley v.
Frensley, 177 Okla. 221, 58 P.2d 307 (1936) (award of husband's one-half interest in the net
proceeds of a trust was upheld).
325. 149 Okla. 63, 299 P. 202 (1931).
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time.32 6 It said that a void judgment neither operated as an adjudication
denying alimony nor as one awarding alimony. 27 This result left undetermined the original proceeding as to alimony still pending before the court.328
The trial court was ordered to set it for a hearing. 29
As the court stated in Clark v. Clark,330 "The trial court perforce retains
jurisdiction to modify a provision of its decree void because of uncertainty,
in order to achieve validity thereof. This continuing jurisdiction is retained
by the trial court to the exclusion of any other court."33' This statement
constitutes an exception to the normal rule that in an equity case the
appellate court may enter the judgment that should have been rendered if
the trial court had not abused its discretion. 332 This point is often neglected
33
by attorneys and the court of appeals.

326. Id. at 203.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.; see also Munsy v. Munsy, 385 P.2d 902 (Okla. 1963); Finley v. Finley, 174 Okla.
457, 50 P.2d 643 (1935); Flaxman v. Flaxman, 169 Okla. 65, 35 P.2d 950 (1934); Dresser v.
Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012 (1933); West v. West, 157 Okla. 89, 10 P.2d 1088 (1932).
330. 460 P.2d 936 (Oka. 1969).
331. Id. at 941 (emphasis in original); see also Steincamp v. Steincamp, 593 P.2d 495, 497-98
(Okla. 1979).
332. Attorneys app-aling a divorce case must remember that the standard of review for equity
cases is different than the standard of review in law cases. The equitable standard is alluded to
in many cases but is moit completely set forth in Carpenter v. Carpenter, 645 P.2d 476 (Okla.
1982):
[Divorce] contests are of equitable cognizance. The court may exercise continuing
jurisdiction of disputed claims. On appeal, the trial court's disposition is reviewed
by the standards applicable to chancery cases. The court's decision is presumed to
include a finding favorable to the successful party upon every fact necessary to
support it. While an appellate court may and will examine and weigh the evidence,
the findings and decree of the trial court cannot be disturbed unless found to be
against the clear weight of the evidence. Whenever possible, an appellate court
must render, or cause to be rendered, that judgment which in its opinion the trial
court should have rendered. A decree need not rest upon uncontradicted evidence.
It is not fatal to the validity of an equity decision if, on the basis of the evidence
presented, the chancellor might have been equally correct in reaching a conclusion
different from that which he actually did. If the result is correct, the judgment is
not vulnerable to reversal because the wrong reason was given for the decision or
because the trial court considered an immaterial issue or made an erroneous finding
of fact. We are not bound either by the reasoning or the findings of the trial court.
Whenever the law and the facts warrant, we may affirm the judgment if it is
sustainable on any rational theory and the ultimate conclusion reached below is
legally correct. Urless the decision is found to be against the clear weight of the
evidence, the appellate court must indulge in the presumption that it is correct.
Id. at 480.
333. See Hughes v. Hughes, No. 71,886 (Okla. Ct. App. Tulsa Apr. 23, 1991), where the
appellate panel reduced an education award to two years at $3,000. In Ingham v. Ingham, No.
73,670 (Okla. Ct. App. Oklahoma City Mar. 12, 1991), an educational expense provision was
simply deleted as violative of the sum certain rule. In Branch v. Branch, No. 74,440 (Okla. Ct.
App. Oklahoma City July 9, 1991), the trial court required the husband to pay his wife's health
insurance and for uncovered medical expenses as support alimony. The court of appeals simply

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss4/2

1991]

THE SUPPORT ALIMONY LAW

Neither reason for requiring alimony to be set in a definite amount retains
validity today. The statute - title 43, section 121, as amended in 1976 no longer uses the word "sum. 33 4 It merely requires that "alimony may
be allowed from real or personal property, or both, or in the form of a
money judgment. ' 33 5 There is nothing in the current statute that continues
the "sum certain" requirement.
The fact that alimony is a judgment does not require that it be set in a
definite amount. The legislative amendments adding section 134(E), which
allow retroactive modification of support alimony, have eliminated the
rationale of the Gilcrease case.336 There is nothing in the concept of "judg37
ment" that requires non-modifiability.
Hopefully, the supreme court will, in an appropriate case, abolish the
"sum certain" rule as an anachronism. If so, then Oklahoma law will be
in a better position to assess the differences between rehabilitative and
permanent alimony.
V.

Modification of Alimony

Prior to 1967, Oklahoma law did not allow an alimony judgment to be
modified. 33 8 This precept was considered part of the "sum certain" rule.
Alimony was a final judgment. "The court has no power, on subsequent
application showing circumstances thereafter arising, to increase or diminish
the allowance given in the original judgment." 33 9 Even after Oklahoma law
allowed for termination or modifiability upon certain possibilities, those
contingencies had to be strictly observed. In Abler v. Abler,340 the husband
had a disabling heart attack and was unable to work. 41 The court of appeals
stated that this change of circumstances was not a ground for reducing
support alimony. 342 However, his child support was reduced to one dollar
343
a month.

deleted the award. All of these cases should have been remanded to the trial court to re-determine
the amount of support alimony.
334. 43 OKa. STAT. § 121 (Supp. 1989).
335. Id.

336. 1983 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 86, § 1.
337. Witter v. Witter, 762 P.2d 919, 919 (Okla. 1988); Bingham v. Bingham, 751 P.2d 732,
732 (Okla. 1988); Nantz v. Nantz, 749 P.2d 1137, 1140-41 (Okla. 1988).
338. E.g., Abler v. Abler, 586 P.2d 761 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
339. Dutton v. Dutton, 97 Okla. 234, 223 P. 149, 150 (1924) (quoting with approval as
authoritative interpretation of statute Mitchell v. Mitchell, 20 Kan. 665, 668 (1878)).
340. 586 P.2d 761 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
341. Id.at 762.
342. Id.at 763.
343. Id.; see also Shotwell v. Shotwell, 603 P.2d 1140 (Okla. 1979) (husband's obligation to
pay the house mortgage as support alimony survives the sale of the house; husband must pay
the amount directly to the wife); Fisher v. Fisher, 558 P.2d 391 (Okla. 1976) (husband cannot
collaterally attack alimony provisions as excessive, even if amount has become more than his net
pay).
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A. Remarriage and Death
The first ground,; approved by the legislature for modification or termination of alimony were death and remarriage. Section 134(B) now requires
that the trial court "decree that upon the death or remarriage of the
recipient, the payments for support, if not already, accrued, shall terminate." 34 Accrued payments that are delinquent are a debt due to the
deceased's estate if properly claimed by the executor or administrator within
ninety days after the payee's death 45 The supreme court equalized the
spouses by providing that alimony would also terminate upon the death of
the payor.Y6
Section 134(B) provides that a recipient spouse who remarries may petition
the court for continuance of the support alimony. 47 The recipient must file
the motion within ninety days after the remarriage. 34 She must also show
that some amount of support is still needed and that circumstances have
not rendered payment of support inequitable. 49 The ninety-day period given
to the recipient to show a continued need for support alimony begins when
the recipient remarries. In Overton v. Overton, 31° the trial court provided
that the wife's support alimony was not to begin until three years after the
divorce.35' This event would occur at the time that the wife's property
3 3
division alimony ended.35 2 The wife remarried one year after the divorce.
She did not file a petition within ninety days after her remarriage. 35 4 The
husband filed his petition to declare the support alimony terminated before
the time to begin payment of the support alimony.3" The wife argued that
she had ninety days to file her petition commencing on the date that the
support alimony began. 316 The court rejected this argument and held that
the ninety days runs from the date
of remarriage, regardless of when the
37
payment of alimony commences. 1
3 the court held that an annulment of the remarriage
In Kildoo v. Kildoo,11
did not revive the alimony award. The court was concerned that the wife,
by electing to obtain an annulment rather than a divorce, could choose to
make her first husband responsible for alimony rather than her second
344. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 134(3) (Supp. 1990).

345. Id.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Funnell v. Funnell, 584 P.2d 1319, 1324 (Okla. 1979).
43 OKLA. STAT. § 134(B) (Supp. 1990).
Id.
Id.
578 P.2d 1216 (OlIa. Ct. App. 1978).
Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1217.
Id.

354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.; see also Acker v. Acker, 594 P.2d 1216 (Okla. 1979) (90-day period may not be

construed as extending the time of termination while the court determines whether wife is entitled
to a continuation of the payments under the separation agreement).
358. 767 P.2d 884 (Okla. 1989).
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619

husband. 5 9 Concluding that the wife should not have that choice, the court
determined that her alimony ended upon her remarriage. 60 The court noted
that she had ninety days upon remarriage to commence an action continuing
her alimony.3 61 That she misunderstood
her rights and did not do so, did
62
not excuse the failure to proceed.
The court's reasoning is somewhat flawed. The second marriage lasted
only two months. The circumstances of the second marriage do not suggest
that Ms. Kildoo would be entitled to any alimony from her second husband.
There was no need for support that was related to that marriage. Thus, to
suggest that the wife could choose what husband to fasten an alimony
obligation upon suggests that the wife is always entitled to alimony. This
position has never been adopted in Oklahoma. Indeed, as Justice Simms
pointed out in his dissent, the case did not really involve the issue of whether
an annulment of the second marriage revived the support alimony. 63 The
annulment occurred prior to the ninety-day period for filing the petition.
Hence, she was not required to seek relief under section 134(B).
Other states are split on whether an annulled remarriage revives the
alimony payments. In some jurisdictions the remarriage, whether annulled
or not, terminates the alimony. 36 In other states the annulment automatically
reinstates the alimony payments. 65 The more modern position does not take
a strict "all or nothing" approach. It allows a court to exercise discretion
3 66
to restore alimony if it is necessary to rectify serious inequity or injustice.
If the parties remarry each other, the alimony provisions in the decree
terminate.36 7 Mere cohabitation with a former spouse for a period of time,
not constituting a common-law marriage, does not terminate the alimony. 6
It is still an open question whether cohabitation with one's former spouse
could cause alimony to terminate under section 134(D).
B.

Cohabitation

In 1979, the legislature reacted to a spate of couples who lived together
after divorce in an arrangement short of a common-law marriage. The
lawmakers determined that under certain circumstances a voluntary cohabitation ought to affect the alimony judgment and enacted section 134(D). 69
Previously, a court had no authority to modify or terminate support alimony
3 70
simply because the recipient was engaged in a cohabitation relationship.
359. Id. at 885-86.
360. Id. at 886.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 887 (Simms, J., dissenting).
364. Falk v. Falk, 158 Wis. 2d 184, 462 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Ct. App. 1990); Hodges v. Hodges,
118 Ariz. 572, 578 P.2d 1001, 1005-06 (1978).
365. Johnston v. Johnston, 3 Kan. App. 2d 208, 592 P.2d 132, 135 (1979).

366. Williams v. Williams, 208 Mont. 252, 677 P.2d 585, 587 (1984).
367. Carson v. Carson, 143 Okla. 274, 288 P. 475, 475 (1930).
368. Rice v. Rice, 603 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Okla. 1979).
369. 1979 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 278, § 1. The statute's constitutionality was upheld in Roberts
v. Roberts, 657 P.2d 154 (Okla. 1983).
370. Allgood v. Allgood, 626 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Okla. 1990).
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The statutory provisions are triggered by the voluntary cohabitation of a
former spouse with a member of the opposite sex. Cohabitation is defined
as the "dwelling together continuously and habitually of a man and a
woman who are in a private conjugal relationship." 37' The statute does not
define the term "conjugal." However, Black's Law Dictionary defines the
term as "belonging to ... the married state. ' 37 2 Conjugal rights refer to
"society, comfort and affection. 373 The question of whether the statute
requires that the man and woman have
sexual relations in order to trigger
374
the statute has not been determined.
The cohabitation arrangement is required to be with a member of the
opposite sex. 375 Thus, there is no to basis to modify or terminate alimony
under this statute if the recipient has established a homosexual cohabitation
arrangement, or has lived with friends or with relatives. Those relationships
would not qualify under the statute.
The statute also requires that the cohabitation be "habitual and continual. ' 376 The purpose of the statute, according to the concurring opinions
in Roberts v. Roberts3M is to treat de facto marriages as de jure marriages.
However, in Roberts, the trial court applied the statute when the recipient
and her boyfriend spent twenty nights together over a six-month period.
This aspect of the case apparently was not raised on appeal. 378 Recent
unpublished cases indicate that the trial
courts are more sensitive to the
379
requirement of continual cohabitation.
It appears that the statute is available to a paying spouse who forms a
cohabitation arrangement. The wording of section 134(D) indicates that it
applies to a "former spouse" who is in a conjugal cohabitation arrangement.
371. 43 OKu.A. STAr. § 134(D) (Supp. 1990).

372. BLACK's

LAW

Di-noNARY 302 (6th ed. 1990).

373. Id.
374. Cf., under a comparable Illinois statute, Sappington v. Sappington, 106 II. 2d 456, 478
N.E.2d 376 (1985) (conjugal does not imply sexual relations but merely living in a marriage-like
relationship), rev'g 123 III. App. 3d 396, 462 N.E.2d 881 (1984) (alimony cannot be terminated
absent proof that the parties were engaging in sexual relations; statute specified "conjugal"

relationship).
375. 43 OxcA.

STA".

§ 134()) (Supp. 1990).

376. Id.
377. 657 P.2d 153, 155 (Okla. 1983) (Opala, J. concurring).

378. Id. at 158 (Opala, J., concurring).
379. For example, in Lynch v. Lynch, No. 72,959 (Okla. Ct. App. Oklahoma City Apr. 23,
1991), the evidence showl-d that the ex-wife had engaged in sexual relations with her boyfriend
outside the home during the last six years. The fact that her boyfriend had stored clothing in
the barn and had stayed in the home for a six-day period was not sufficient to prove continued
and habitual cohabitation. The trial judge's sustention of the wife's demurrer to the evidence
was upheld. In Hyroop v. Hyroop, No. 74,998 (Okla. Ct. App. Oklahoma City July 2, 1991),
the evidence showed only that the ex-wife spent a lot of time with her boyfriend. They took

vacations together and spent a lot of time in each other's company. However, she maintained
her own home. The trial court's order to reduce the alimony slightly was justified under section
134(E). The court of appeals noted that the trial court had applied an erroneous standard to
determine cohabitation. The payor must prove cohabitation only by a preponderance and not by
clear and convincing evidmce.
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The paying spouse who forms a cohabitation relationship may be able to
petition for a reduction in the amount. The voluntary cohabitation of the
paying spouse with a member of the opposite sex cannot be used by the
recipient spouse to raise the amount of alimony. Under this section, the
trial court is only given authority to terminate or reduce the amount of
alimony.
The amount of support alimony can be modified or terminated if the
trial court finds that there has been a substantial change of circumstances
relating to the need for support or the ability to support. 80 There have as
yet been no cases interpreting this part of the statute. In all probability,
the interpretations of the practically identical language in section 134(E) will
also be applicable to this section.
C. Changed Circumstances
The last of the amendments to section 134 is subsection E. This section
authorizes the trial court to modify the provisions of a decree pertaining to
support alimony upon proof of changed circumstances relating to the need
for support or the ability to support."' If the court finds that the changes
are substantial and continuing as to make the terms of the
decree unrea2
sonable to either party, the judge may modify the decree.1
There are no published cases interpreting section 134(E). Several issues
arise under this section. First, what is a provision pertaining to the payment
of alimony as support? In particular, is a clause which says no alimony
should be paid a "provision pertaining to the payment of alimony as
support?" Can a spouse return to court after a period of time and ask for
alimony because conditions have now changed and there is a need for
alimony? Can a court reserve jurisdiction over alimony?
Other jurisdictions are split over this issue. In some states, a spouse is
entitled to return to court at any time if his or her circumstances have
changed so as to require alimony. 3 3 Other states do not allow for alimony
3
if it was not granted in the original decree. 4
A different result may be reached, however, if a spouse is returning to
court to obtain additional alimony after the expiration of the original
alimony award. In Marshall v. Marshall,3 5 the wife filed to modify the
support alimony award four months after it expired. She had cancer. 386 The
Iowa Supreme Court said public policy required that courts hear cases where
support is necessary.3 7 The court distinguished cases where no alimony was
ever awarded. 8 There, the court has no power to modify. 9
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

43 OKLA. STAT. § 134(D) (Supp. 1990).
Id. § 134(E).
Id.
See Cherrington v. Cherrington, 404 Mass. 267, 534 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (1989).
In re Woita, 98 Or. App. 83, 778 P.2d 504, 506 (1989).
394 N.W.2d 392 (Iowa 1986).
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id. at 397.
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In some states, the courts are authorized to reserve jurisdiction with
regard to alimony. If jurisdiction is reserved, a spouse may return to court
to seek support. If jurisdiction is not reserved, a spouse may not seek
further alimony.319 This method is particularly appropriate if the wife needs
alimony at the time of the divorce and the husband is unable to afford it.
The decree should recite that fact, decline to award a specific amount, and
reserve jurisdiction to award alimony as circumstances change. 391 Usually,
in order for the court to reserve jurisdiction, there must be a determination
that alimony is necessary at the time of the divorce. 392 It is inappropriate
absent an express reservation of
jurisdiction to award nominal alimony in
393
order to preserve modifiability.
The second issue in interpreting section 134(E) is determining what occurrences will justify a modification in alimony. The statute requires that
the changes be "substantial and continuing so as to make the terms of the
decree unreasonable to either party." 3 94 There appears to be no reason why
the statutory formula would not allow increases as well as decreases. This
fact is particularly true when the language of section 134(E) is compared
with section 134(D), which only allows the judge to reduce or terminate
support alimony.3 95 Additionally, because the purpose of section 134(E) was
to allow for modifiability, the trial court can modify both the total amount
of alimony and the amount of the payments, and, if the sum certain rule
has disappeared, require periodic alimony. 3m The court of appeals has
suggested that cases involving modification of child support
will provide
397
persuasive authority for modification of alimony cases.
The following are the types of circumstances that most jurisdictions
consider when deciding modification of alimony cases.

388. Id. at 397.
389. Id. at 394-95; see also Aldinger v. Aldinger, 813 P.2d 836, 839-40 (Colo. App. 1991). It
was not appropriate, the court said, to limit the dependent spouse's access to court, nor to limit
the court's jurisdiction, with regard to the issue of whether a modification was appropriate even
though an actual need for further or continued support might not have been apparent during
the term of limited maintenance. Id. at 839.
390. See McNally v. McNally, 516 So. 2d 499, 502 (Miss. 1987); Branson v. Branson, 411
N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (N.D. 1987); Becker v. Becker, 262 N.W.2d 478, 483 (N.D. 1978).
391. See, e.g., Grady v. Grady, 295 Ark. 94, 747 S.W.2d 77, 79 (1988).
392. Donahue v. Donahue, 299 S.C. 353, 384 S.E.2d 741, 747 (1989); Turrisi v. Sanzaro, 308
Md. 515, 520 A.2d 1080, 1086 (1987).
393. See Donahue v. Donahue, 299 S.C. 353, 384 S.E.2d 741 (1989) (award of $1a month
disapproved); Grady v.Grady, 295 Ark. 94, 747 S.W.2d 77 (1988) (award of $10 a month
disapproved).
394. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 134(E) (Supp. 1990).
395. Id. § 134(D).
396. See Wilkins v. Wilkins, No. 74,355 (Okla. Ct. App. Tulsa Aug. 27, 1991) (holding trial
court erred in dismissing for failure to state a claim the wife's petition to modify alimony by
increasing the amount anti the number of payments).
397. Colbert v. Wilson, No. 73,257 (Okla. Ct. App. Oklahoma City Apr. 30, 1991).
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Reduction in the Payor'sIncome

If the payor is claiming there has been a reduction in income, the court
will scrutinize the reason for the decline. If the decline is not within the
control of the payor, a reduction may be warranted. In Marriageof Schradie,3 95 the payor, a trucker, was entitled to modification in light of a change
in circumstances constituted by, inter alia, deregulation in the trucking
industry resulting in tremendous growth in competition, the adverse impact
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the husband's need to repair or replace
his truck to secure his future earning capacity.399
However, if it appears that the payor's changed economic circumstances
are self-induced, the court may refuse to modify alimony. In Marriage of
Kelly,40 the husband's financial difficulties were attributable, at least in
part, to his decision to resign his employment. The court may impute
income to him in deciding on an appropriate support award. 40 If the payor
can still afford to pay the support, the court may require it in spite of
changed circumstances. 402

2. Increase in the Payee's Income
Most jurisdictions agree that a substantial increase in the earnings of the
payee spouse may be the basis for reducing or terminating support alimony,
particularly if the alimony was rehabilitative originally. In Schofer v. Schofer° 3 a modification was approved. At the time of dissolution, the former
wife worked part-time for less than minimum wage earning only $241 gross
per month.40 At the time of the modification, she was working on a
permanent full-time basis and earning $855 net per month.0 However, if
the payee spouse still has a need for support regardless of the increase in
income, a modification may be denied.40
398. 462 N.W.2d 705 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
399. Id. at 708-09; see also Reep v. Reep, 565 So. 2d 814 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990) (participation
in a legal strike, accompanied by diligent efforts to seek reemployment may form the basis for
a petition for modification of alimony); Kalif v. Ballanco, 538 So. 2d 1100 (La. Ct. App. 1989)
(payor's present wife had become unemployed, forcing the former husband to pay all household
expenses; an increase in medical malpractice insurance premiums and forced participation in a
retirement plan, all combine to produce a change of circumstances).
400. 769 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
401. Id. at 468.
402. Edmons v. Bisbano-Edmons, 590 A.2d 97, 99 (R.I. 1991) (although the husband testified
that he had reduced his salary and cut back on his business expenses, he continued to have a
Jaguar as well as a second automobile at his disposal and possessed several corporate credit
cards).
403. 780 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
404. Id. at 70-71.
405. Id. at 71; see also Colbert v. Wilson, No. 73,257 (Okla. Ct. App. Oklahoma City Apr.
30, 1991) (approving as within the trial court's discretion a termination of support alimony when
the wife is employed and her income had substantially increased).
406. Curzi v. Curzi, 21 Conn. App. 5, 570 A.2d 1134 (1990); see Capehart v. Capehart, No.
72,425 (Okla. Ct. App. Oklahoma City Nov. 13, 1990) (no modification because even though
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3. Increase in Payor'sNet Income
Normally, an increase in the payor's net income alone is insufficient
to call for an increase in alimony. Even under a California statute
designating the marital standard of living as one of the factors to be
weighed in determining spousal support, a former wife was not entitled
to an upward modification of such support.40 7 The wife argued that she
must maintain the same standard of living she allegedly enjoyed during
the marriage. 40 8 The actual marital standard was unreasonably high because the former husband was working excessive hours during the marriage and the parties were living beyond their means. 40 9 The mere fact
that the former husband's income level had risen to the point where he
could afford such support did not mandate the upward modification
410
sought by the former wife.
However, in Schlesinger v. Emmons,41 1 the husband received a substantial post-divorce inheritance, which the court said justified an increase
in alimony. The case fell within an exception that when there is insufficient money at the time of divorce to provide for the wife at the
couple's standard of living they enjoyed during their marriage, it is
proper to grant the increase.4 1 2 The couple had planned on the inheritance
to establish their standard of living during the marriage. 413 It followed
the other general rule that an increase in the payor's funds may justify
an increase in support when the payor does not have
sufficient funds to
41 4
satisfy the support required at the original decree.
4. Increased Needs of Payee
If the payee suffers from a change that requires increased support,
courts are usually willing to grant it. This adage is particularly true if
the needs are medical. In Marriage of Polette,4 1 the wife had been
diagnosed before the dissolution as having an adjustment disorder and
a dependent personality. 41 6 She also suffered from alcohol abuse. 4 7 The
trial court awarded gradually decreasing support for five years based on
its belief that her health would improve and that she would become self-

wife is employed, husband showed neither a substantial decrease in wife's need, nor a substantial
decrease in his ability to pay); cf. Lane v. Lane, 35 I11.
App. 3d 276, 340 N.E.2d 705 (1976)
(wife entered a convent; husband's motion to terminate alimony denied).
407. Marriage of Smith, 225 Cal. App. 3d 469, 274 Cal. Rptr. 911, 963 (1990).
408. Id., 274 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
409. Id., 274 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
410. Id., 274 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
411. 566 So. 2d 58:3 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990).
412. Id. at 584.
413. Id. at 585.

414.
415.
416.
417.

Bedell v. Bedell, 561 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
99 Or. App. 327, 781 P.2d 1253 (1989).
Id., 781 P.2d at 1254.
Id.
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supporting. 45 However, the mental health experts' testimony showed that
the wife's condition had not improved and in fact appeared to have
deteriorated. 4 9 The court stated that the wife showed a substantial change
in circumstances warranting an upward modification of spousal support. 420 In Brashier v. Brashier,421 the former wife's continued psychiatric
disability and its hindrance on her effort to become self-sufficient justified an increase in alimony. Even though most of the adverse conditions
experienced by the wife existed at the time of divorce and were anticipated, the wife's continued inability to alleviate those conditions was not
anticipated. 422 It is not necessary that the change of condition relate to
423
a need that occurred during the marriage. In Marriage of Perlmutter,
the court increased alimony from $195 per month to $600 per month
when the ex-wife was seriously injured in an automobile accident and
the ex-husband had a substantial increase in his reported income.
5. Retirement of the Payor
One of the more controversial issues is whether the retirement of the
payor can constitute a change of circumstances and justify a decrease in
the amount of support. In some states, retirement is such a change, even
when the husband knew at the time of divorce that he would be retiring
shortly.4 4 If the ex-wife is able to support
herself, courts seem quite willing
4
to reduce or terminate the support.

15

418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id., 781 P.2d at 1255. McNutt v. McNutt, No. 70,496 (Okla. Ct. App. Oklahoma City
Dec. 19, 1989) (unpublished) appears to be the first and only case involving an attempted upward
modification of support alimony under § 134E. The husband filed a motion to reduce support
alimony, and the wife countered with a motion to increase. The trial court denied the husband's
motion and granted the wife's to increase the alimony by $150 per month over the time previously
set. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision to increase. It noted that the original
decree was a "consent decree" where the wife did not prove a need for alimony. The husband
testified that he agreed to that amount of support alimony in return for the wife's relinquishment
of any claim to a property division of the family business. The court concluded without rationale
that the increase was against the weight of evidence and reversed. The cases suggest that in order
to justify an increase in support alimony, it is necessary to show that there is a record from the
merits hearing indicating a need for alimony. This result makes little sense when compared with
the rest of Oklahoma case law on support alimony.
421. 80 Md. App. 93, 560 A.2d 44 (1989).
422. See also Alder v. Alder, 229 N.J. Super. 496, 552 A.2d 182 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988)
(ex-wife's loss of employment due to the deterioration of a preexisting congenital eye condition
known at the time of divorce constitutes a change in circumstance).
423. 772 P.2d 621 (Colo. 1989).
424. See Pimm v. Pimm, 568 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); McFadden v. McFadden,
386 Pa. Super. 506, 563 A.2d 180 (1989).
425. See Reeves v. Reeves, 803 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (husband's retirement coupled
with ex-wife's career as a nurse where she earns $40,000 justifies a reduction in alimony). This
appeared to have been the case in Colbert v. Wilson, No. 73,257 (Okla. Ct. App. Oklahoma
City Apr. 30, 1991). The court noted that the husband had retired and the wife was now gainfully
employed; hence alimony should be reduced.
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When the payor voluntarily takes early retirement, courts carefully scrutinize the case. Courts first determine whether the early retirement decision
was made in good faith. If it was not, there will be no reduction in the
alimony.426 In addition to good faith, many courts require a further inquiry
into whether the earf.y retirement was reasonable under the circumstances.4 27
This probe includes an examination of the parties' expectations at the time
of the divorce, their age, health, ability to pay maintenance after retirement,
42
and the ability of the recipient spouse to provide for him or herself.
6. Bankruptcy
The cases have generally held that bankruptcy can create a change of
circumstances which may justify modification of the alimony payments. For
example, in Seigel v. Seigel,429 the husband's voluntary bankruptcy discharged his equitable distribution payout to his ex-wife. This justified,
according to the court, an increase in his alimony obligation.4 10 Conversely,
in Marriage of Clements, 43' the wife took voluntary bankruptcy. The court
held that the discharge of her debts reduced her need and thereby her
alimony. 432
V. The Role of the Settlement Agreement
A. General Validhiy
As Oklahoma cases begin to decide when support alimony decrees may
be modified, the role of separation and settlement agreements gains in
importance. Counsel who are concerned about whether a future court might
modify or terminate alimony upon retirement, bankruptcy, or other foreseen
events, should attempt to draft for these contingencies.
Oklahoma law has always favored various types of matrimonial contracts,
including reconciliation, separation, and settlement agreements. In Howell
v. Howell,433 the parties separated and entered into a contract upon reconciliation. Ms. Howell later sued on the contract when the parties again
separated. 434 The supreme court noted the normal rule - that contracts
providing for the separation of the husband and wife in the future are
void. 3 However, thir, contract was for the reconciliation of the parties and
426. See In re Sinks, 204 Cal. App. 3d 586, 251 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1988) (husband's voluntary
retirement was suspect; court did not abuse its discretion in setting alimony based upon husband's

ability to earn).
427. See, e.g., Dilger v. Dilger, 242 N.J. Super. 380, 576 A.2d 951 (Ch. 1990).
428. In re Smith, 77 Ill. App. 3d 858, 396 N.E.2d 859 (1979).
429. 243 N.J. Super. 211, 578 A.2d 1269, 1270-71 (1990).

430. Id. at 1272; see also Eckert v. Eckert, 144 Wis. 2d 770, 424 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Ct. App.
1988).
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.

134 Cal. App. 3d 737, 184 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1982).
Id., 184 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
42 Okla. 286, 141 1'. 412 (1914).
Id., 141 P. at 413.
Id.
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therefore was favored. 4 6 Because
there was no fraud in procuring the
4 37
contract, the court enforced it.

438
Separation contracts also received approval early in Oklahoma's history.
Unlike reconciliation agreements, separation agreements are nullified if the
parties resume cohabitation.43 9 However, if the parties do separate and
partially perform the contract, the contract will govern their separation, and
it can be enforced in the same manner as any other contract. 440 The
agreement does not have to be presented to any court. The parties are
required to have entered into the agreement and have separated. If the wife
later sues for separate maintenance and the contract mentions nothing about
alimony, she will not be allowed to obtain it."'
Settlement agreements were given the court's blessing in King v. King." 2
The court noted that since statehood Oklahoma statutes have allowed
husband and wife to contract, in writing, for an immediate separation and
make provisions for property division, alimony, and custody." 3 In King,
the court approved an agreement in which the wife was to receive certain
promissory notes when she procured the divorce decree. 4" The husband
later argued that because the contract required obtaining the divorce in the
future, it fell under the ban of the Howell case. The supreme court disagreed
and indicated that even if the clause requiring the wife to obtain a divorce
was void, it did not effect the remaining agreement." 5
The court reconsidered the issue in Wheeler v. Wheeler.44 This time the
court, after examination of opinions from a number of other states, concluded that Oklahoma law should allow parties to contract for the property
division provisions of their divorce." 7 The supreme court noted such agreements are generally valid, absent overreaching that would amount to fraud. 44
However, the court did hold that if an agreement is presented to the
court as a settlement of their rights during a divorce proceeding, "the court
in every case should scrutinize such a transaction very closely to ascertain
whether the same was fairly entered into and whether or not the same is
reasonable, just and fair to the parties to the agreement." 449 In determining
whether the agreement is fair, the court must look beyond the terms of the
contract. It has the right to consider all the circumstances surrounding the

436. Id., 141 P. at 414.
437. Id.
438. See Hale v. Hale, 40 Okla. 101, 135 P. 1143 (1913).
439. Fowler v. Fowler, 119 Okla. 95, 248 P. 629, 631 (1926) (cohabitation for four months
nullified separation agreement); Ahrens v. Ahrens, 67 Okla. 147, 169 P. 486, 487 (1917).
440. Witt v. Witt, 280 P.2d 709, 711 (Okla. 1954).
441. Horn v. Horn, 80 Okla. 60, 194 P. 102, 103 (1920).
442. 138 Okla. 40, 280 P. 271 (1929).
443. See 43 OKu.A. STAT. §§ 205-206 (Supp. 1990); OKLA. Rav. LAWS §§ 3354, 3355 (1910).
444. King, 280 P. at 273.
445. Id., 280 P. at 272-73.

446. 167 Okla. 598, 32 P.2d 305 (1934).
447. Id., 32 P.2d at 308.
448. Id.

449. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:585

contract, including the ages of the parties, their needs, health, financial
conditions, opportunities to provide for themselves, and their contributions
450
to the marital estate.
If a property settlement presented for approval of a court in a
divorce proceeding meets all equitable and statutory requirements,
then there is no reason why the trial court should not approve
the agreement entered into between the husband and wife, for in
so doing justice is administered. However, if the trial court is of
the opinion that such a division of the jointly acquired property
does not appear reasonable, just and fair, it becomes his duty to
reject and disaipprove said contract in whole or in part, and to
make a just, fair and reasonable division between the parties. A
property settlement entered into between husband and wife without regards to a divorce is unquestionably valid and eriforceable,
in the absence of fraud, duress, coercion, and undue influence,
but when the same is presented affirmatively or defensively in a
divorce proceeding for the sanction of the trial court, the trial
or in part, if,
court is not required to follow the same in whole
45
in its opinion, the same is not fair and just. '
This holding continues as a foundation in Oklahoma law. The settlement
agreement, insofar as it is presented to the divorce court, must be approved
by the court before it can become part of the decree. If the court disapproves
of the agreement, it has no effect. 452
B.

Incorporation, Aferger, and Extinguishment

If, after entering into a separation or settlement agreement, the parties
reconcile, the contract is extinguished. 453 If the parties obtain a divorce and
the court awards alimony or divides property under the terms of the contract,
the contract disappears. The judgment replaces it, and the parties' rights
must be in accord with the judgment. 454 Even if the trial court denies the
divorce, so long as it divides the property, the contract is extinguished. 455
If the parties do not file for a divorce or reconcile, the contract continues
to be valid. If sued upon, a court must enforce it. The court cannot, as
part of its judgment enforcing the contract, reserve the right to modify it
456
inthe future.
450. Id.

451. Id.
452. Wheeler, 32 P.2d at 307; see also Campanello v. Mason, 571 P.2d 449 (Okla. 1977);

Miller v. Miller, 456 P.2d 113 (Okla. 1969) (trial court expressly disapproves agreement as
inequitable); Blount v. Blount, 425 P.2d 474 (Okla. 1967); Limb v. Limb, 195 Okla. 249, 156
P.2d 1013 (1945); Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012 (1933).
453. Fowler v. Fowler, 119 Okla. 95, 248 P. 629, 631 (1926).
454. Finley v. Finley, 174 Okla. 457, 50 P.2d 643, 645 (1935) (separation agreement); McRoberts
v. McRoberts, 177 Okla. 156, 57 P.2d 1175, 1178 (1936) (settlement agreement).
455. Privett v. Privett, 93 Okla. 171, 220 P. 348, 349-50 (1923).
456. Stark v. Stark, 185 Okla. 348, 91 P.2d 1064, 1068 (1939).
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In Murphy v. McElroy,417 the court discussed what happened to a settlement contract when it was not presented to the divorce court. The parties'
settlement agreement provided that the husband would pay $175.10 per
month as alimony. 4 8 The payments would stop upon the death of either
party or the remarriage of the wife. 419 The agreement also divided the
property of the parties.4 ° The divorce decree made no reference either to
the settlement agreement, property rights, or alimony. 461 Upon the wife's
remarriage, the husband stopped paying alimony. 6 2 She sued under the
contract, contending that, the alimony was still due because the remarriage
clause was invalid.4 3 The court disagreed, holding that the sum certain rule
only applied to judgments. 464 The parties were free to contract for whatever
terms they liked. 46 This contract was not presented to the trial court and
was therefore neither merged into nor extinguished by the divorce decree.
Therefore, it continued to exist as a separate contract, which by its terms
extinguished the wife's right to alimony.A
The next variation on the problem occurred in Dunham v. Dunham.467
The parties presented the settlement agreement to the trial court, which
approved the agreement and ordered the husband to perform it. 46 The trial
judge provided for alimony payments in the decree corresponding to the
amounts mentioned in the agreement. 469 The decree did not mention any of
the other items which were contained in the agreement.
The husband contended that when the court approved the agreement,
ordered it performed, and incorporated the alimony provisions in the decree,
the agreement was extinguished. 470 The supreme court disagreed, stating that
when the trial court incorporated the alimony provision, it left the contract,
as modified by the decree, in full force and effect. 471 Insofar as the court
does not set the agreement out in the decree, but resort to the contract is
necessary to determine the rights of the parties, then the contract continues

457. 185 Okla. 388, 92 P.2d 369 (1939).
458. Id., 92 P.2d at 370.

459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id.

462. Id.
463. Id., 92 P.2d at 371.

464. Id.
465. Id., 92 P.2d at 373.

466. Id. at 371-73; see also Pielsticker v. Callahan, 428 P.2d 203 (Okla. 1967); Sullins v.
Sullins, 280 P.2d 1009 (Okla. 1955); Herd v. Bilby, 199 Okla. 437, 186 P.2d 833 (1947) (court

approves contract to pay alimony which will terminate on wife's remarriage; approval of contract
and ordering it performed does not extinguish it); Seyller v. Seyller, 190 Okla. 250, 122 P.2d
804 (1942) (reaffirming Murphy; upholding contract which provided for acceleration of alimony
payments upon husband's default).
467. 191 Okla. 395, 130 P.2d 534 (1942).
468. Id., 130 P.2d at 537.

469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id.
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and is not extinguished. 72 However, if the trial court holds that the agreement is "approved and referred to and made a part hereof, as if fully
written herein, then
the decree supersedes the agreement and the agreement
3
is extinguished.

'

4
1 1

Those agreements that exist independently of the decree continue to be
enforceable as contracts. However, because they are not incorporated into
the decree, they cannot be enforced as a judgment, and the contempt remedy
is unavailable. 474
C. Settlement Agreements: Enforcement and
the Ability to Contract Around Existing Law
The interesting remaining issue concerns whether the parties can contract
for an alimony arrangement outside the power of the court, have it incorporated in the decree, and then enforce it as a judgment. The court first
discussed this issue in Perry v. Perry.4 75 The husband filed to terminate his
ex-wife's alimony because she remarried.47 6 The trial court denied his motion
because the divorce decree specifically provided otherwise. 477 That decree
referred to the parties' agreement and ordered that, pursuant to that contract, the alimony provisions should not terminate upon remarriage, "notwithstanding provisions of the statute to the contrary." 478 The court noted
that prior cases had approved of the parties entering agreements at variance
with statutory and case provisions. 47 9 It then found that the legislature did
not intend to preclude parties from freely contracting with respect to the
disposition of their property and as to alimony. 4 0 All that is necessary, the
court stated, is that there be a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of
a known right. 411 For the first time, the court allowed the parties to
incorporate the agreement into the decree, allowing it to be enforced as
part of the decree.
Unfortunately, within a year after Perry, the court rendered a decision
which cast doubt upon the entire area. In Stuart v. Stuart,482 the husband
filed to terminate hi; ex-wife's support alimony on the ground that she had

472. Allen v. Allen, 196 Okla. 36, 162 P.2d 193, 194-95 (1945); Eatman v. Eatman, 549 P.2d
389, 391 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) (only those aspects incorporated in the decree are extinguished).

473. Eatman, 549 P.2d at 391; Barnett v. Barnett, 207 Okla. 234, 249 P.2d 88 (1952).
474. Dickson v. Dicksoa, 637 P.2d 110, 112 (Okla. 1980); Grimshaw v. Grimshaw, 581 P.2d

1329, 1332 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
475. 551 P.2d 256 (Okla. 1976).
476. Id. at 256.
477. Id. at 257.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 258. In addition to the cases involving support alimony, see Mills v. Mills, 512
P.2d 143 (Okla. 1973) (parties may agree to waive the requirement that the joint titles be severed);

Hicks v. Hicks, 417 P.2Al 830 (Okla. 1966) (agreement providing for child support through
college).

480. Perry, 551 P.2d at 258.
481. Id.
482. 555 P.2d 611 (Okla. 1976).
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remarried. 4 3 The parties' agreement did not mention whether the support
alimony would terminate upon remarriage. 4 4 The divorce decree incorpo45
rated the agreement and likewise did not mention terminability of alimony.
Justice Barnes, speaking only for a plurality of the court, determined that
the alimony could not be modified. 416 The plurality opinion ignored all the
prior cases on the effect of an agreement incorporated in a decree. It found
that the agreement was a "consent decree," i.e., one that was entered upon
and pursuant to a written agreement of the parties. 48 7 The court then
concluded if the decree is one which leaves nothing for the court's adjudi48
cation, it is one that cannot be modified without the consent of the parties. 1
If the Stuart decision had been allowed to stand, Oklahoma law would
have been placed in a strange dichotomy. All divorce decrees based on a
settlement agreement would have been labeled "consent decrees" and impervious to subsequent modification. Only decrees that were produced by
actual litigation could be modified. The entire distinction between incorporated and non-incorporated agreements would have been abolished. It
seemed quite doubtful that the court meant to throw away fifty years of
doctrine without any consideration. Obviously, the Stuart case needed to
be re-rationalized.
This reevaluation occurred in Batchelor v. Batchelor.4 9 In that opinion,
the court stated that Stuart merely held that the court could construe the
agreement to determine whether the payments were to be payments of
property division alimony or support alimony. 490 If construed as property
division alimony, it would not be subject to termination or modification.4 9'
Thus, Stuart does not stand for a proposition concerning consent decrees.
In Batchelor, it was clear that the parties' agreement provided for support
alimony. Therefore, the failure to include a provision in the agreement that
the support alimony would not terminate upon remarriage meant that the
normal statutory termination provisions would apply. The statutory provision applied, and the wife's support alimony terminated when she remarried.
The case that clarifies the law in this area is Dickason v. Dickason.492
The court noted that when the agreement is incorporated in the decree, the
rights of the parties are no longer governed by the contract but by the
494
decree or judgment. 493 The agreement is extinguished by force of law.

Justice Opala then opined:
483. Id. at 613.
484. Id. at 615.
485. Id. at 613.
486. Id. at 616.
487. Id. at 614.
488. Id. at 615. Justice Simnms concurred in the result for other reasons and four justices
dissented. Id. at 616.
489. 585 P.2d 1120 (Okla. 1978).
490. Id. at 1122-23.
491. Id. at 1123.
492. 607 P.2d 674 (Okla. 1980).
493. Id. at 677.
494. Id.; see also Acker v. Acker, 594 P.2d 1216 (Okla. 1979).
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An intent to modify applicable law by contract is not effective
unless the power is expressly exercised. There is no rule of law
that makes a contract-based divorce decree [a] per se free from
legal incidents ordinarily attachable to the class of judgment into
which it falls or [b] impervious to the law which generally governs
the class of obligations comprised within it. To escape the incidence of general law, the agreement or decree must not be silent
as to the parties' intent vis a vis the law that applies to them. 41,
If attorneys desire to contract around the applicable substantive law, the
following procedure should be used. First, it is essential to use two separate
documents: an agreement and a decree. Simply calling the decree a 49"consent
6
decree" will not suffice to avoid applicable statutory or case law.
Second, the agreement should specifically state that the parties are aware
of their rights under the applicable cases and statutes and they choose to
waive those rights. If the parties do not specifically state so, then the
agreement, as incorporated into the decree, becomes subject to interpretation
and construction as to what was the intention of the parties. In Chiles v.
Chiles,497 for example, the parties' divorce decree incorporated an agreement
which provided that support alimony was "cancelable only upon the wife's
death pursuant to agreement of the parties. ' 498 The issue raised was whether
the wife's remarriage entitled the husband to terminate his support alimony
obligation under title 43, section 134(B). 4 99 The husband argued that because
the decree was silent on termination, the normal statutory rules for termination of alimony applied.5 00 The court of appeals determined that the issue
was one of construing the decree to determine the parties' intent.5 0' It held
that the word "only" meant that the parties agreed that only death would
terminate the alimony support502 Here the court did find that the parties
intended to waive the statutory right to terminate alimony upon remarriage. 03
If a modifying court finds that the language of the agreement is ambiguous, it could find that the agreement does not meet the Dickason standard
that it not be silent as to the parties' intent vis-a-vis the law that applies to
them.Sc 3 4 Some support for examining the agreement as a whole to determine
495. Dickason, 607 P.2d at 677.
496. Ettinger v. Ettinger, 637 P.2d 63, 65 (Okla. 1981).
497. 778 P.2d 938 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989).
498. Id. at 940 (emphasis in original).
499. Id. at 939.
500. Id. at 940.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id. at 940. The language of the settlement agreement in Chiles was not clear. Today the
court of appeals might not be as generous with the agreement. In Capehart v. Capehart, No.
72,425 (Okla. Ct. App. Oklahoma City Nov. 13, 1990), the court said that the agreement must
expressly proscribe future modification of spousal support in order to contract around the statute.
The court also said that to the extent that Chiles is inconsistent with the opinion, it is specifically
disapproved.
504. See supra note 484.
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the parties' intent can be found in Greer v. Greer. °5 That agreement, as
interpreted by the court, provided that, in the event Congress provided for
additional benefits to which the wife may be entitled, she was to receive
them pursuant to the decree.2 6 The court concluded that this was a sufficient
waiver of the protection from retroactive modification of property divi07
sion.1
Third, the parties must then decide whether the contract is to be incorporated into the decree. If it is incorporated into the decree, it is enforceable
as a judgment. If left out of the decree, it is enforceable as a contract. The
parties must decide which is the most desirable for them.
VII.

Conclusion

Of all the substantive areas surrounding divorce law, support alimony
continues to present the greatest controversy. In one sense Oklahoma appears
to be at the beginning of a brand new day concerning support alimony. It
is now fifteen years since the legislature started down its new path. It is
time for the court to recognize that fact and implement the "new" law of
support alimony. Future years should indicate that alimony will continue
to be one of the most litigated areas of the law.

505. 807 P.2d 791 (Okla. 1991).
506. Id. at 745-46.
507. Id. at 795.
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